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This research report compiled by the Foreign Policy Association is a collection of eight articles by key individuals in education and social sciences. The study's central themes are recognition of the rapid social and cultural change in human affairs, the need to review international education developments, and a clarification of educational objectives. Each paper examines how well U.S. schools are meeting the challenge of preparing today's youth for full participation in world affairs. Following a brief introduction by the project director, the essays explore ideas on the structure of, and problems inherent in international education, the high school social studies curriculum, the social sciences framework, information dissemination on world affairs education, technological progress, and concepts of a global society. (DS)

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PROGRESS REPORT
for period July 1, 1968 - September 30, 1968

OEC 1-7-002908-2028

# AN EXAMINATION OF OBJECTIVES, NEEDS AND PRIORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION IN U.S. SECONDARY AND ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

James M. Becker
Foreign Policy Association

November 14, 1968

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U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare

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Title of Project: An Examination of Objectives, Needs, and Priorities in International Education in U. S. Secondary and Elementary Schools

Name of Project Director: James M. Becker

## 1. Major activities and accomplishments during this period:

A. As one means of reporting on our project, the FPA staff prepared the November issue of Social Education for the National Council for the Social Studies. The issue includes several of the papers prepared for the project as well as other related materials prepared by staff.

FPA intends to distribute to key individuals and groups approximately 2,000 copies of the complete issue plus several hundred reprints of individual articles.

See Appendix for copies of articles included.

B. The existing working papers have been circulated to selected authorities to ascertain their opinions and suggestions.

C. In preparation for the final report, staff have been revising and expanding the existing working papers.

D. In conjunction with the project, staff consulted with several key individuals in the fields of education and social science, among whom were the following:

Braulio Alonso
Committee on International Relations
National Education Assoc.

William Breese
Washington, D. C.

Russell Broadhead
California State College
Haywood, Calif.

The Hon. W. Randolph Burgess
Atlantic Treaty Assoc.
Atlantic Council of the U. S.

June Chapin
Teacher
Menlo Park, Calif.

Richard Clark
Sacramento High School
Sacramento, Calif.

Jack Curtin
San Francisco State
College

Richard Foster
Superintendent
San Ramon Valley Unified
School District
Danville, Calif.

Thomas Fox
Petaluma High School
Petaluma, Calif.

Jack Fraenkel
San Francisco State College

Leroy Graymer
Dept. of Political Science
University of California

Elgin Heinz
Washington High School
San Francisco, Calif.

LeVell Holmes
Menlo-Atherton High School
Atherton, Calif.

William Jones
California State College
Haywood, Calif.

Charles Keserich
San Jose State College

Edith King
School of Education
University of Denver

Frank Klassen
Associate Secretary
American Association of Colleges
for Teacher Education

William Kline
Stanford University

Roger Langton
Gunn High School
Palo Alto, Calif.

Constance L'Aventure
University of California
Berkeley, Calif.

Robert Leestma
Assistant Commissioner of
Education and Director,
Institute of International
Studies
U. S. Office of Education

Sid Lester
Marin Social Studies Project
Corte Madera, Calif.

Eunice Loewke
Secondary Coordinator
Petaluma City High School
District, Calif.

Harold Long
Adirondack World Affairs
Resources for Education
Glens Falls, New York

Helen Mineta
San Jose High School
San Jose, Calif.

Penrod Moss
Assistant Superintendent
Dixie Elementary School
District
California

Ward Morehouse
Director
Center for International
Programs & Services
New York State Dept. of
Education

Jack Sutherland
San Jose State College

Jan Tucker
Stanford University

Gertrude Vasche
Stanislaus County Schools
Modesto, Calif.

Preston Valien
Deputy
Bureau of Higher Education
U. S. Office of Education

Fred Wilhelms
Executive Secretary
Association for Supervision
and Curriculum Development

Richard Whinnery
Sacramento City Schools
Sacramento, Calif.

2. Problems: None

3. Significant Findings and Events: See Section #1 and Appendix

4. Dissemination Activities:

A. As indicated in Section #1, the November issue of Social Education was prepared as a means to report on the project.

B. An article on the study was prepared by Lee Anderson and James Becker and submitted to the International Studies Association to appear in the Fall issue of the ISA Quarterly.

C. Presentations about the project were made to the following groups:

Northern California Curriculum Conference, Alta Mira Hotel, Sausalito, California, September 28-30

Estes Park Conference on Elementary Education, Stanley Hotel, Estes Park, Colorado, July 19-21

NDEA Institute, Colorado College, July 8

D. The working papers were distributed to approximately 50 educators and curriculum specialists in response to inquiries about the project.

5. Capital Equipment Acquisitions: None

6. Forms: None

7. Other Activities: None

## 8. Staff Summary:

| Name | Title or Function | Funds | | Period employed | Percent of time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Federal | Local | | |
| Roger G. Mastrude | FPA Vice Pres., Program Development | x | | July 1 - Sept. 30 | 40% |
| James M. Becker | Project Director | x | | July 1 - Sept. 30 | 33% |
| Lee F. Anderson | Project Coordinator | x | | July 1 - Aug. 31<br>(Sept. 1 - 30, Mr. Anderson has served as part-time conference coordinator) | 100% |
| H. Thomas Collins | FPA Director of School Services, N. Y. Region | | x | July 1 - Sept. 30 | 10% |
| Elaine A. Malmberg | Admin. Secretary | x | | July 1 - Sept. 30 | 100% |

## 9. Future activities planned for next reporting period:

A. Plans were finalized and invitations were mailed for the two final conferences to be held in conjunction with the project, the main purposes of which will be to report on the study and to ascertain reactions to our proposed recommendations.

Dates and Sites:

October 27-29 - Illinois Beach Lodge, Zion Illinois

December 8-10 - Tappan Zee Motor Inn, Nyack, N. Y.

B. Staff plans to make a presentation to a conference for college and university faculty on "Preparing Social Studies Teachers to Teach About Cultures Other Than Our Own," to be sponsored by the University of the State of New York, New York State Department of Education, on October 25-26.

C. Plans were initiated for a panel on international education at the 1969 meeting of the American Political Science Association in which Lee Anderson, the project coordinator, will participate.

D. Plans have been made for the further circulation and revision of existing papers and for continued interviewing and consultation with key persons.

## 10. Certification

M Becker

Signature of Contract Officer

Signature of Project Director

Date

November 14, 1968

Date

# INTRODUCTION

James M. Becker

The essays in this special issue of Social Education are, like so much inquiry and writing these days, a by-product of the rapid social and cultural change that has engulfed modern man. It has become conventional, indeed trite, to speak of ours as a revolutionary era. But however passé such characteristics may have become they continue to point up a most significant feature of man's contemporary condition. "We are experiencing one of the great revolutionary transformations of mankind."[1] It is a proposition to which most can agree. One suspects that the historian C. E. Black does not exaggerate when he observes:

> The change in human affairs now taking place is of the scope and intensity that mankind has experienced on only two previous occasions and its significance cannot be appreciated except in the context of the entire course of world history. The first revolutionary transformation was the emergence of human beings, about a million years ago, after many thousands of years of evolution from primate life....
>
> The second great revolutionary transformation in human affairs was that from primitive to civilized societies...[2]

One need not agree that these two epochal events exhaust the periods of revolutionary transformation in human affairs, but they do serve as useful analogues in our efforts to understand what is happening in the Twentieth Century. For, as Black goes on to note: "The process of change in the modern era is of the same order of magnitude as that from prehuman to human life and from primitive to civilized societies..."[3]

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[1] C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History, (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1967), p. 1.

[2] Ibid., pp. 1 and 2.

There can be little question that one very important aspect of change in the modern world is the eradication of boundaries that once separated domestic and international affairs. "If ever the line between domestic and foreign affairs could be drawn," Senator Fulbright has observed, "it is now wholly erased."[4] The world beyond our national boundaries unrelentlessly impinges upon us; and we in turn continuously interject ourselves into the lives of others.

We frequently characterize what has happened as the decline of American isolationism or the revolution in American foreign relations. While such descriptions are accurate, they can also be misleading if we fail to see that America's experience is not uniquely American. What is happening to us is also happening in varying degrees to the rest of the world as well. If American society has become substantially less isolated from the world around it, the same is true of virtually all nations. For the first time since the emergence of our species, mankind now lives in what Raymond Aron and others aptly term as an "era of universal or global history." Robert Harper makes the same point in noting that "throughout most of history, mankind did exist in separate, almost isolated cultural islands ... now most of humanity is part of a single world-wide system."[5] Most of us now live in a physical, psychological and moral neighborhood that has an international color and dimension. Indeed the world seems well along to becoming a kind of tribal village, as Marshal McLuhan put it, but the natives are armed with nuclear weapons instead of spears.

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[3] Ibid., p. 4.

[4] Senator J. W. Fulbright, "What Makes U. S. Foreign Policy?", The Reporter, Vol. XX, May 14, 1959, p. 19.

Preparing young people to live creatively and cooperatively instead of destructively in this village is a major responsibility of schools. This assumption makes imperative a review of developments in international affairs education and continuous clarification of educational goals and objectives.

How well are the schools meeting the need to prepare young people for participation in a global village? There is no simple "very well" or "very poorly" answer to this question.

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[5] Robert A. Harper, "Geography's Role in General Education," *Journal of Geography*, Vol. LXV, April, 1966, p. 182

If adequacy is judged by where we stood a couple of decades ago and where we have come since then, we can point to a great deal of progress in planning and developing new programs and materials. Many schools have expanded their efforts to teach about the so-called non-western world. A few states and several hundred school districts have created special courses in non-western studies. Several of the federally-financed curriculum projects in social studies are creating materials and teaching guides for courses and units on Africa, Asia, and Latin America. At the same time many schools are beginning to interject more comparative materials into traditional studies of American society. There are new materials available commercially for the comparative study of politics and economics in the ninth grade. New materials will soon be available for the comparative study of family systems and American history as well as politics and economics. The study of international relations and foreign policy is increasing in salience as textbook materials, simulations, and case studies become more readily available. Many teachers as well as professional historians are turning their attention to the task of "globalizing" world history courses by both expanding the time and attention students devote to the study of human history in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and by seeking ways to reduce the ethnocentrism characteristic of many of the older European-centered treatments of the non-western world. There are also continuing efforts to enhance the accuracy and objectivity of images of other societies and of international events that are communicated by classroom literature.[6]

But adequacy cannot be judged solely by how far we have come from where we once stood. Education must be judged by what needs to be done as well as what has been done. Judged by this standard there is less ground for optimism, for it is possible to make progress relative to the past but still lose ground. The transmission of research results into methods and materials of instruction that can be used in schools has been slow. The expertise and accumulated knowledge represented by the large number of area studies centers, social science research generally and special projects has had little effect on teacher preparation and until recently little impact on curriculum development. A recent study by Dr. Harold Taylor points out,

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[6] A summary of many of these developments can be found in "Teaching World Affairs Tomorrow," Intercom, Vol. IX, No. 5, September 1967. (Foreign Policy Association).

"To enjoy any longer the luxury of defining one's nation, one's society, or oneself in terms of pride of ancestry, social superiority, or power of destruction is not only supremely dangerous to survival of the race, but intellectually and socially obsolete."[7]

Yet much of what daily takes place in classrooms across the nation seems to re-enforce these outmoded and dangerous concepts. Despite the enormous acceleration in the frequency and scope of international activity and despite the future-oriented thinking going on at universities and research centers, most people today seem bound by the old ways of perceiving reality. This conceptual lag evident among many Americans, including their schools, is especially noticeable in perception of the term "international."

While at the moment this may seem to be the only term available for describing the whole gamut of relations that transcend national boundaries, as a concept "international" is losing its accuracy and utility. The word must either be discarded or radically altered to fit the new realities of relationships among members of the human race.

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[7] Harold Taylor, The World and the American Teacher, (Washington, D.C.: The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1968), p. 16

"International" may well have been a perfectly meaningful concept when interactions of peoples were primarily at the inter-nation level. But today interactions of national governments are a small portion of trans-national contacts. New kinds of relationships have burgeoned between individuals and among groups that require a drastic change in our thinking about what is "international." The growth of tourism and the proliferation of non-governmental organizations among peoples, to mention two examples, require it. And, thanks to the electronic media, the global scene has become part of every American's living room. We are approaching the time when people everywhere can see and hear each other almost instantaneously. Road maps of the American highway system in the 1940's will not adequately describe the highway system of the 1960's, nor do many of our images of the world acquired in the 1940's enlighten us about today's spaceship earth. In a time when both the world is rapidly changing and new modes of understanding the world are being developed, it is imperative that we continuously re-examine the basic issues: How can we best conceive the subject matter and structure of international education? What ought to be the objectives of world affairs education? What kinds of learning experiences and teaching materials must we develop? These are the questions discussed in the following essays.

# APPENDIX

WRITTEN FOR FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
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NOVEMBER, 1968

# AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

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Of fundamental importance to the development of future curriculum in international education are two issues, which can best be put in the form of questions: What is international education? What should be the primary objectives of international education? It is to these questions that I address myself in this essay.

## What is International Education?

To ask the question "What is International Education?" is to call for a definition, and definitions are always stipulations. Obviously, there is no such thing as international education in the sense of something stored away in the universe awaiting discovery and then description. International education, like the Constitution, is what the judges say it is. In this case, the judges are American educators and social scientists, joined by countless school boards, parents and others who direct and shape the work of the schools. But the fact that all definitions are stipulations does not mean that some definitions cannot be good or bad, or, at least, better or worse than others. For definitions derive a relative value from how well they serve our needs as guides to action and directives for thought. Thus, we can usefully ask: How can we most fruitfully define or conceive of international education as we set about the tasks of planning and developing new curriculum appropriate to the educational needs of a generation of of children and young people who will live out much of their adult lives in the Twenty-First Century and who, in the apt image of Paul Todd, will become "the first settlers to colonize the lunar wastes."[1]

The adequacy of conceptions of international education depends in large measure upon the adequacy of our operating views of the world; that is, what we teach young humans about the world into which they have been cast must reflect our images of what that world is like, along with our guesses about what it will be like when our students become adults. Even though very few schools and not many teachers will claim to have a formal theory or an articulated philosophy of international education, nevertheless the content and organization of a school's curriculum reflect an operating conception of what world affairs education is all about.

A survey of the curriculum guides, teaching materials and approaches used in many schools suggests that much of our past and present teaching is grounded on an image of the world as a mosaic of richly varied lands and peoples. An anthropologist examining the artifacts of American education in an effort to reconstruct the culturally shared world-view of Americans might well conclude that we tend to see the world as a kind of pool table on whose green surface are found an array of scattered and self-contained billiard balls of various colors. Similarly international education has been largely a matter of instructing the young about many colorful lands and peoples other than ourselves -- of providing them with some information about the different ecologies, the particular histories and the unique cultures of a few of the different balls arrayed about the table's surface. Clearly this is an excessively simplified picture, but perhaps not an entirely gross caricature of the international dimension of the curriculum found in many American schools.

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[1] Lewis Paul Todd, The Social Studies and the Social Sciences, (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 284

There is nothing wrong with our traditional conceptions in the sense of being incorrect. In fact, the world is a very large and varied collection of different civilizations, geographical regions, cultural areas and societies with differing histories, cultural systems, and social institutions. Nor is there any question that international education consists in large measure of transmitting to young Americans some knowledge about the planet earth's many other lands and human variations with the hope that while learning about others Americans will also better understand themselves.

But our conceptions of things can be correct and at the same time incomplete. Our inherited conceptions and traditional approaches to international education appear to be a case in point. On the one hand, by viewing and teaching about the world as a collection of geographically different regions and culturally variant groups of humans, we succeed in more or less adequately depicting several basic features of the human condition. But on the other hand, this view fails to highlight other equally salient facts about man's contemporary lot. To be sure, the social fragmentation and spacial isolation of different groups, the peculiarites of local, national and regional histories, and cultural heterogeneity are all characteristics of our species' historical sojourn, about which we must seek to develop some knowledge and understanding in the minds of young humans. But for a generation that will be the builders of a "post-modern" world (assuming that our generation does not destroy the basic building materials first), this is not enough. The international education of the young must be better than ours. It must clearly reflect the historically new and emergent features of the human condition as well as its more ancient characteristics.

James Becker points out in the Introduction to this issue of Social Education that one of the hallmarks of our time is the historically unprecedented degree to which our species has become interdependent at the global level. The world has ceased to be a piece of cosmic real estate on whose land live diverse and scattered bands of relatively autonomous and isolated homo sapiens. Mankind as a species continues to be spacially dispersed and separated as well as socially fragmented and culturally heterogeneous; but a good deal of the autonomy that historically characterized the planet's different regions and the species' many sub-groups has been swept away in the flow of contemporary history.

There are many ways in which we try to describe what is happening around us. We talk of a "shrinking world" and of "growing interdependence." Historians speak of the universalization of world history to depict the fact that the world has acquired a common history which is more than the sum total or aggregation of thousands of local histories. Social scientists frequently make use of the concept of system and describe the world as a global system comprised of many interacting sub-systems. What is a system?[2]

Simply defined, a system is any set of interrelated elements. Hence, we call a furnace and thermostat a heating system or a network of interconnected roads a highway system. And we refer to a family as a system because the individuals are linked to one another in complex relations of mutual dependencies. This is to say, the behaviors of one member of the family radiate their effects outward to influence the behaviors of others.

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[2] See Walter Buckly, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967) for a somewhat difficult but excellent discussion of the concept of system in sociological analysis.

The"systemness" of families is well illustrated by the "vicious circle of hostility" phenomenon, whose many forms are, unfortunately, familiar to all of us. For example, Little Johnny returns from school in a bad mood. Aggressions generated by the frustrations of the classroom or the playground are directed toward his mother. By the end of the afternoon her mood has been infected by his, and her hostility is taken out on her husband when he returns from work an hour late and without the loaf of bread he promised to pick up. The husband then criticizes Johnny unjustly when he accidentally spills his milk at the dinner table. This, of course, reinforces the hostility that initially set the circle of reactions into motion.

In the same general sense, one can talk about the "systemness" that has come to characterize the human species at the global level. One social scientist illustrated this as follows:

> Civil disturbances in the Congo and in South Vietnam have their repercussions in New York, Moscow, and Peking; crop failure in India calls forth a response from the American midwest; nuclear explosive power unites men around the world in the fear of holocaust and the dread of environmental contamination; physical changes on the surfaces of the sun affect man's ability to communicate with his fellow men; complex sensors located in artificial earth satellites reveal guarded secrets concerning the capabilities of another group; a desert war east of Suez threatens to bring the industrial machinery of Europe to a grinding halt; new ideological notes struck on the taut strings of Balkan societies set up entirely new patterns of harmony and disharmony in world affairs.[3]

The "unity," the "wholeness," the "interdependence," the "systemness" of the modern world -- whatever may be one's favorite word -- is manifest in a number of ways. Let us now consider several of the most important ones.

An expanding volume of world-wide human interaction. World history affords few, if any, examples of societies that have been wholly isolated from contact with or removed from the influence of other societies. But there is no question that the Twentieth Century is witnessing a very sharp expansion in the volume and scope of interactions among the world's hundreds of national and local societies. The political scientist K. J. Holsti wrote:

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[3] E. Raymond Platig, International Relations Research (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966) p.2.

> ...All indicators used to measure the amount of interaction and the number of transactions between states in the contemporary international system suggest rapid and continuing expansion of both intergovernmental and private contracts....All of these...[Indicators] suggest the same conclusion: while in historical international systems contacts between political units were made primarily through formal diplomatic channels and occasionally through private trade, today the level of interaction, whether measured by diplomatic contacts, international travel, mail communication or commerce, is very great and is growing rapidly. Although widespread personal contact between citizens of different countries is still beyond the means of most people, those who spend their entire lives in one locality are still made aware of the external environment through various media of communication to an extent that earlier generations would have found impossible.[4]

*An expanding network of cross-national organizations and associations.* Prior to this century the contemporary international system was comprised almost exclusively of nation-states and colonial dependencies. With the exception of the Church and dynastic and military alliances, there were few cross-national organizations or associations. But in our time the globe has become encircled by an expanding grid of organizations and associations cutting across boundaries of national systems. More than a hundred organizations link national governments; and there are several hundred nongovernmental organizations -- religious, fraternal, scientific, business, artistic and humanitarian-- that are not bound by the geography of the nation-state system. The importance of nongovernmental organizations can be sensed by glancing at the budgets of large international business firms, many of which exceed by millions of dollars the budgets of most of the world's nation-states.[5]

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[4] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 78-80. For recent statistics and a discussion of the growth of cross-national relations among private individuals, see Robert C. Angell, "The Growth of Trans-National Participation," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 23, 1967, p. 108-129. Also relevant is the November, 1966, issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* which is devoted to "Americans Abroad."

*Increasing similarity in mankind's social behaviors and institutions.* Norman Cousins, in a recent *Saturday Review* editorial, dramatized this similarity of the modern world in this way:

> A new musical comedy erupts into success on Broadway and within a matter of weeks its tunes are heard all the way from London to Johannesburg, as though they had pre-existed and were waiting only for a signal from the United States to spring to life. Or a new movie about the Russia of a half-century ago will be made from a book, and all over the world the theme song from *Doctor Zhivago* will be a request favorite of orchestras in far-off places, from Edmonton to Warsaw.
>
> Few things are more startling to Americans abroad than to see youngsters affect the same unconventionalities in dress and manner, whether in Stockholm, Singapore, or Sydney. The young girls with their flashing thighs on Carnaby Street in London or on the Ginza in Tokyo; the young males with their long hair and turtleneck sweaters (with or without beads) in Greenwich Village or the Left Bank or Amsterdam or Hong Kong -- all seem to have been fashioned by the same stylists of alienation and assertion.
>
> Or a fashion designer in Paris will decide to use spikes instead of heels on women's shoes, and women across the world will wobble with the same precarious gait. Then, almost as suddenly, the designer will decide to bring women back to earth again, flattening the heels and producing square or wide toes that only a few years earlier would have been regarded as acceptable only for heavy work in the fields -- and once again the world's women will conform.[6]

Increasing commonality in socio-cultural forms is not confined to styles in music, art, dress, dancing or the proclivity of youth to rebel. The traditional diversity of the core social systems of polity, economy and family appears to be lessening. Within the more developed regions of the planet, complex technologies harnessed to large-scale bureaucracies seem to carry their own universal social imperatives. Thus modernized, mass societies

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[5] See Chadwick F. Alger, "International Organizations and World Order: Social Science As a Source of New Perspectives," Chapter 3 in Howard D. Mehlinger & James M. Becker, eds., *International Dimensions in the Social Studies*, Thirty-Eighth Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, (Washington, D.C., National Council for the Social Studies, 1968).

[6] Norman Cousins, "Hoodoo: A New World Theme Song," *Saturday Review*, July 13, 1968, p. 20.

(such as the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and most European countries), while continuing to reflect the influence of their own peculiar histories and ideologies, evidence increasing similarity in their economic, political and social structures.[7]

Another way of putting this is to say that modern technology in communication and transportation is creating a pool of socio-cultural forms at the global level from which all of the human species can draw in varying degrees. To date this global pool has been fed predominantly by tributaries from Western civilization, largely because the emergence of modern science and technology allowed Europeans to dominate the planet and, hence, to disseminate elements of Western culture throughout the world.

But before the century is over, we shall very likely see that cultural diffusion is even more of a two-way street, bringing many elements of traditional Eastern culture to the West as much as the reverse. For example, many young people who have been accustomed since birth to a relatively affluent life are beginning to probe seriously the question: beyond affluence, what? In an age of global communication why should we expect that this growing segment of the population will confine its search for answers to traditional

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[7] Discussions of this matter include: John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967); Wilbert E. Moore, "Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System," and "The Utility of Utopias," in Wilbert E. Moore, Order and Change: Essays in Comparative Sociology, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967); Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967) particularly pp. 82-88; Carle C. Zimmerman, "Convergence of the Major Human Family Systems During the Space Age," in Edward A Tiryakian, ed., Sociological Theory, Values and Socio-Cultural Change, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, "Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" in Alvin W. Gouldner and S.M. Miller, eds., Applied Sociology, (New York: Glencoe Free Press, 1965) pp. 260-265.

Western culture or be content to import from the East no more than Nehru jackets and Easternized "hot rock."

The internationalization of social problems. The growing interconnectedness of peoples has among its consequences the internationalization of many aspects of man's ageless problems of survival. The pollution of air and water, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the plundering of the planet's mineral resources are only a few of the problems that cannot be tackled effectively, much less solved, by unilateral measures of nation-states. International cooperation has become necessary in almost every facet of the species' social life, including the areas of education reform, the promotion of new sources of food supply, the stimulation of technological growth, the acceleration of economic development, and the dissemination of new medical knowledge.

…………………

These are a few and only a few of many characteristics of modern history that lead to a view of the world as a single global system comprised of many interacting regional, national and local systems. Barbara Ward summarizes the point well:

> In short, we have become a single human community. Most of the energies of our society tend towards unity -- the energy of science and technological change, the energy of curiosity and research, of self-interest and economics, the energy -- in many ways the most violent of them all -- the energy of potential aggression and destruction. We have become neighbors in terms of inescapable physical proximity and instant communication. We are neighbors in economic interest and technological direction. We are neighbors in facets of our industrialization and in the pattern of our urbanization. Above all, we are neighbors in the risk of total destruction.[8]

Implications for international education. Viewed against the backdrop of the whole of man's history, the continuing transformation of the world from a *collection* of many lands and peoples to a *system* of many lands and peoples is a profound change in the human condition. The emergence of the contemporary world system carries with it far-reaching implications for the task of socializing and formally educating young people. Undoubtedly we are now unable to see some of these implications; others we can perceive only darkly. But there are a couple of matters that seem clear enough.

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[8] Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. 14.

Clearly the relative importance of international education in the overall process of social education is increasing; and, accordingly, there is a need to find ways of expanding international studies in schools. But the creation of new courses and the injection of new content into old courses, taken by themselves, are an insufficient response to the growing interconnectedness of mankind. We need to re-examine seriously the basic structure of international education and devise new approaches to the organization and content of international education.

Perhaps such a re-examination might usefully proceed from the fact that in studying any phenomena we have a choice of approaches. As David Singer wrote:

> Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, for example, choose between the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang....[9]

The choices we make are a function of our purposes. If our aim is to understand trees as such, then we need pay little or no attention as to whether the particular trees are parts of a forest. But if our purpose is to understand a forest, then we must also study trees; but in this case they must be studied as parts of a larger whole.

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[9] J. David Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problems in International Relations in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System, Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1961) p.77.

The emergence of a world system makes this matter of the parts and the whole a critical issue as we set out to plan and develop new curriculum aimed at enhancing students' understanding of the world. It is critical in two ways. First, it is important in respect to the purposes that lie behind our efforts to teach about the world. Second, it is important in respect to developing approaches to world affairs education that are congruent with our purposes.

Traditionally we have defined our major purpose in teaching about the world as developing students' international or world understanding. But what kind of understanding do we seek to develop? Is the goal restricted to an aggregation of knowledge about the parts or is the goal to include knowledge of the world system as a whole? At a time when the world consisted of many parts with very little "wholeness," this distinction was probably pedagogically unimportant, if not downright irrelevant. But today the distinction is important because an aggregation of understandings about parts does not equal an understanding of the world as a whole -- no more than an understanding of American society is simply an accumulation of separate understandings about each of the fifty states that make up American society. Robert Harper has made this point very well in talking about education in geography, but his observations seem equally relevant to all dimensions of world affairs education:

> ...the whole world is more important than its parts. It is understanding of the world-wide system of humanity living on the earth that we want the student to grasp, not just an understanding of the parts -- the regions that have been the center of the geographer's attention. The region is no longer primarily important in itself. The important thing is to see how it fits into the larger world system.
>
> This calls for a whole new approach in geography. No longer can we study the United States just in terms of learning its own characteristics and of comparing those characteristics with those of other parts of the... world with the aim of seeing similarities and differences. We must now see the United States as part of the world-wide system of ideas, goods and peoples.

> Of course, to understand the world as a whole, we must scrutinize the parts, but the aim is always to see the part in the context of the bigger whole.[10]

To develop a curriculum in world affairs that treats the world as a whole will not be an easy intellectual task nor one that will be completed overnight -- and, perhaps, not at all. The task is difficult for several reasons. Perhaps the principal one is to be found in a set of simple facts about ourselves. In order to teach about the world system we must first be able to think and talk about the world as a whole; and to do this, we must have available a repertoire of relevant concepts and a vocabulary of appropriate symbols. And here is where we are most deficient.

The contemporary world system is in large measure one of the unanticipated and unplanned outcomes of two gigantic and still little understood events in our history as a species. One of these is European expansion -- the fact that after centuries of being largely bounded to the northwestern region of the planet, one relatively small and technologically advanced group of *homo sapiens* suddenly broke loose from its historic boundaries and began to roam the entire globe, decimating dozens of ancient societies in the process and establishing economic domination and political control over a large share of mankind. The other, and obviously related event, is the rise and subsequent global diffusion of modern science and technology. Unhappily, these historical forces that created for us a world system did not also see fit to bequeath us an adequate set of concepts and language with which to think and talk about this system. As a consequence, we are now somewhat in the position of a man who must try to understand metropolitan New York but is equipped with only the conceptual and linguistic tools of paleolithic man.

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[10] Robert A. Harper, "Geography's Role in General Education," *Journal of Geography*, Vol. LXV, April, 1966, p. 179.

Of the conceptual tools currently available to us for thinking about the world as a system, the concept of society would seem to be one of the more promising. When we look at the world as a whole -- blending in our perception of some things we know about the birth of human societies at the sub-planetary level and adding a dash of historical imagination -- we can see a global society, albeit in a primitive or embryonic stage of development. And we can catch a fleeting glimpse of our planetary society on those rare occasions when we manage to break free from our own ideosyncratic perspectives and from the larger prison of culturally shared ethnocentrism. Barbara Ward has dramatically described such a glimpse in the metaphor of the earth as a spaceship: "The most rational way of considering the whole human race today is to see it as the ship's crew on a single spaceship on which all of us, with a remarkable combination of security and vulnerability, are making our pilgrimage through infinity."[11]

A growing number of people use such phrases as "international society," "global society," "planetary society," and "world society" in talking and writing about the contemporary world. Might not the time have come to move beyond the easy job of paying rhetorical tribute to our species' growing interdependence and proceed to the much more difficult (and also much more important ) task of rebuilding our basic conceptualizations of the world? Specifically, might it not be time to consider seriously the possibility of planning and developing world affairs education grounded on an image of the world as a global society?[12]

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[11] Ward, op. cit., p. 15.

[12] The terms "world" or "global"or "international" or"planetary" are frequently found in the literature of world affairs, but there are only a few serious efforts to examine the concept of the world as a society. One of these is Quincy Wright, A Study of War, abridged edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), Chapter VIII. One of the most sophisticated and insightful discussions of the concept is in an unpublished paper by Richard C. Snyder, "The Present Distribution of Social Values Among Nations."

The progress in world affairs curriculum development over the past few years makes the idea of a world system approach more than a will-o'-the-wisp. The development of materials for teaching about the non-West, the increased use of comparative studies of social institutions, the employment of educational technologies (such as simulation) that make possible the representation of complex and abstract notions in concrete models, the effort to write materials from a global- or mankind-centered perspective in world history -- these and other recent developments that James Becker notes in the Introduction to this issue of Social Education offer promise for a world-system approach to international education.

But while recent developments have made such an approach conceivable, they have by no means made it inevitable. Indeed, it may well be that as the concept of a global society is translated into the classroom through the development of materials, it will face increasing opposition. The objections (or the objectors) may be put into three general categories -- the first "gut-level" and the others more intellectual.

First, to some people the very notion of common membership in the human species poses a threat, for they feel a need to see themselves and their own particular group as sharply distinct, even superior to the rest of mankind. Or, perhaps through beliefs and attitudes conditioned by racial, religious or national experiences, they may view the concept of a global society as undermining their identity. Such feelings seldom respond to rational arguments. Perhaps all that can be said is there is a need to recognize their existence and work toward the reduction of the number who hold them by a better education at an early age.

Second, some people would argue that to apply the term "society" to the world is inaccurate, since the world taken as a whole does not really possess the defining characteristics of a society. One might want to talk about international or global society in some kind of poetic context where words are permitted to assume strange meanings, or one might want to use such terms when talking about the possible social organization of the human species at some imaginable future; but, so the argument might go, the notion of the world as a society is not to be taken as descriptive of the real world and should certainly not be considered seriously as a core concept around which to build curriculum.

Two things may be said about this argument. First, "the state of being a society" is not like the state of being a human being, where either you are or are not. The concept of society is a very complex notion that abstracts many different features or characteristics of the world as it is experienced. Thus, at any given moment the world system can display some society-like characteristics and not evidence others; however, we apply the concept of "nation" to a country like the Congo which, as we can see, is a nation in some respects and not in others. Or closer to home, can we point to a day in a year when the colonists ceased to be a scattered collection of different groups and became an "American society"?

Second, perhaps we need to expand our conventional, garden-variety conceptions of society in order to accomodate greater variation in the range of empirical reality. For instance, some people say that the world as a whole cannot be considered a society because it does not possess (and perhaps never will) a central government. But the fact that the societies we know best (Western nation-states) are characterized by elaborate and centralized legal and political systems does not mean that all societies must be so characterized any more than it follows that since some fruit is round in shape that all fruit must be round. Some of the societies we conventionally dub "primitive" are stateless societies; that is, they do not have centralized political systems.[13] But one need not go to exotic lands for examples of stateless systems. In many respects we can usefully think of metropolitan areas in the Unitdd States as societies, for they are certainly a more significant kind of social unit than many nation-states. For example, the societies of metropolitan New York or Chicago are stateless systems comprised of hundreds of legally sovereign municipalities, special districts, counties, unincorporated areas, etc., whose interaction is a matter of negotiation, bargaining, conflict and compromise not unlike the same social processes in the international arena.

Take as another example the matter of violence. We sometimes closely associate the absence of political violence with the presence of society and the presence of violence with the absence of society. This makes some sense as long as our attention is confined to the northwestern region of the planet since the rise of the territorial state system in the 17th century. Undoubtedly more human beings living in this area since then have died from political violence between national groups than from violence internal to these groups. But the picture somewhat changes when we broaden our sample of observations. No one can call modern China, Nigeria, Indonesia or the Congo islands of peace in a sea of international anarchy. Or look at Latin America since the Europeanization of this region. Here it is very likely that more people have met their end from violence internal to Latin American countries than from conflict among them.

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[13] Relevant discussions include: John Middleton and David Tait, eds., Tribes Without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958); and Ralph W. Nicholas, "Segmentary Factional Political Systems" in Marc J. Schwartz, Victor W. Turner, & Arthur Tuden, eds., Political Anthropology, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966) pp. 49-59.

Third, it is said that the notion of the world as a society is of no pedagogical utility because, for one thing, it is too abstract for children or adolescents. Whether Bruner is right or wrong (and one suspects he may be right about children's ability to understand most everything that is presented in an intellectually honest way, and wrong about the ability of adults to do this very often), it remains an open possibility that the world viewed as a society is not more and perhaps even less abstract and remote to many of today's children than was, let us say, the Roman Empire to us when our exposure to that society consisted of a few words in a textbook, supplemented, perhaps,by a photo of the Coliseum taken in 1907 or a drawing depicting the assassination of Julius Caesar.

But then it may be asked, "Even if it were possible to communicate the idea of global society to children and young people, why try?" There may be a couple of good reasons. For one thing, the image of the world system as a global society seems to capture several facets of global reality, and there may be some value in trying "to tell it like it is." But the potential utility of the idea goes beyond this.

We are beginning to realize that much of human thinking is comparative, although the act of comparison occurs sub-consciously most of the time. By making this process explicit, that is by doing comparative analysis (which is essentially a matter of asking the same basic questions of different phenomena, obtaining comparable answers, and then noting similarities and differences), we are able to enhance the conceptual dimension of human thought. Partly for this reason comparative analysis has become an important ingredient of the so-called "new social studies." Much of the comparative analysis that is done in both schools and universities is "within levels comparison"; that is, we compare nations with nations, family systems with family systems, forms of poetry with forms of poetry, and the like. But we can and do make comparisons "across levels" of human social organization as well. Thus by conceptualizing the world as a global society we can compare this society (or various aspects of it) with one or more of the some 3,000 primitive, historic, and now national societies about which some information is available. For example, political scientists have found it fruitful to compare the world political and legal systems with those found in some primitive societies, in some of the developing nations, or in some American metropolitan areas.[14]

Should this sound highly esoteric and something confined to university scholars working on the frontiers of their disciplines, it should be noted that the making of "international/sub-international" comparisons is something we all do, albeit usually in an implicit way. For example, much of a child's conceptions of conflict among nations seems to be in the form of projections from what he has learned about human conflict at the inter-personal level. These projections are in effect comparisons of different people's conflict behavior. Unfortunately, many comparisons we implicitly make across levels of human social organizations are wrong. We believe there are significant differences when in reality there are none, or we believe there are no differences when in reality there are some. By making our comparisons explicit, bringing them out into the open where they can be examined, we are able to avoid at least some error in our images of the world.

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[14] Excellent examples include: Chadwick Alger, "Comparison of Intra-National and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVII, June, 1963, pp. 406-419; Michael Barkun, *Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies & the World Community*, (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968); and Raoul Narroll, "Scientific Comparative Politics and International Relations," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 329-337.

But if the idea of taking seriously the concept of global society is controversial, the concept is nonetheless an exciting notion. Admittedly the picture of the world as a planetary society is not the best of all possible photographs of man's contemporary condition, and hopefully it will not be long before our conceptual lenses become much more refined. But in the meantime this picture provides a comparatively better image of "the real world" than does our inherited image of the world as a mosaic of different lands and peoples or as a pool table on whose surface are arrayed self-contained balls called nation-states.

Summary. This essay began with a simple, straightforward question: What is international education? If there has emerged around us a world system, if we seek to develop within students some understanding of this system as a whole, and if we can usefully think of this system as an emergent global society which is analytically comparable to mankind's several thousand sub-global societies, then might it not be fruitful to conceive or define international education as education about international or global society? If so, then this conception provides us with the first of three building blocks for developing future curriculum. A second such block is the objectives that ought to be served by the curriculum. The third is, of course, learning materials which are not discussed in this essay.

## What Should Be the Objectives of International Education?

If we think of international education as education about international society, then in turn we can think of developing students' understanding of international or global society in much the same way that we think of developing understandings of American society, Zuni society, or Indian society. What constitutes an understanding of international society?

We might usefully distinguish two aspects of international understanding, one of which we call objects of understanding, and the other dimensions of understanding.

Objects of international understanding. The verb to understand implies that there are things to be understood; hence the concept of international understanding implies objects of understanding that we seek to cultivate in students. What are these?

A society can be loosely defined as a more or less interdependent set of individuals and groups occupying a given territory with given physical characteristics and socially organized in given ways. Thus, we might develop an understanding of a society's (a) physical environment (more accurately its natural ecology), (b) demography and culture, and (c) its social structure or organization. Such understandings are always comparative, although the comparisons are frequently implicit rather than explicit and verbally articulated. This is to say, we understand a society either by explicitly or implicitly placing it along side other societies about which we have some familiarity or knowledge and noting commonalities and differences.

If this simple (and in some respects excessively simple) conceptual framework is applied to the world viewed as a whole, then the general features of what it means to develop students' understanding of international society become evident. We can, as it were, begin to construct a model of the "objects of international understanding." The following pages briefly sketch out major components of one such model. Each of these elements or components can be elaborated outward with increasing degrees of specificity much as the trunk of a tree branches outward into increasingly smaller branches, but space limits us to a specification of the model's more general elements.

I. The development of students' understanding of global society implies developing students' understanding of the planet earth viewed as one planet among many entities in the larger cosmic system.

  A This includes development of students' understanding of:

    1. The relative location and cosmological status of the earth in the cosmic system.

    2. The cosmological and geological histories of the planet.

    3. Major features and characteristics of the planet's contemporary geology and geography with special emphasis upon the apparent influence of the biosphere on the biological evolution and cultural development of the human species.

    4. World-wide contemporary problems in man-biosphere interrelations, e.g. water and air pollution, natural resource depletion, weather control, etc.

II. The development of students' understanding of global society implies developing students' understanding of mankind viewed as one species of life among many forms of life.

  A. This includes development of students' understanding of:

    1. Mankind's biological and psychic unity (i.e., common needs at the level of man as biological and personality systems).

    2. Basic human behaviors and socio-culturally organized activities with particular emphasis upon developing their understanding of differences and changes in individual behaviors, in cultural systems (systems of socially shared perceptions, beliefs, and values) and social systems such as family systems, political systems, economic systems, communication and transportation systems, etc.

3. A comparative examination of the human species where the objects of comparison are other animals and imagined forms of life elsewhere in the universe as portrayed, for example, some of our better science fiction.

4. Major events or transformations in the evolution and cultural development of the human species.

III. The development of students' understanding of global society implies developing students' understanding of the international social system viewed as one system among many social systems in which they participate and through which human values such as wealth, health, power, safety, respect, and enlightenment are created and allocated.

A. This includes developing students' understanding of major structural characteristics of global society. This further implies developing an understanding of the kinds of phenomena summarized in the following generalizations:

Global society is:

1. A politically uncentralized or stateless society currently comprised of more than a hundred territorial states and many kinds of cross-national organizations.

2. A racially diverse society with a majority of its population being non-white.

3. A multi-lingual society.

4. A religiously diverse society with a majority of its population being non-Christian and non-Jewish.

5. A culturally diverse society (i.e., characterized by significant variations both within and among nations in socially shared perceptions, values, and beliefs).

6. An institutionally diverse society (i.e., characterized by significant variations both within and among nations in political systems, economic systems, family systems, etc.).

7. In general an economically depressed society, but with vast disparities in the distribution of such human values as wealth, health, education, technology, etc.

8. An increasingly interdependent society.

9. An increasingly violent society.
10. A rapidly growing society.
11. An increasingly urbanized society.
12. An increasingly mechanized society.

B. Developing students' understanding of the international social system implies developing students' understanding of the major social processes within global society. These include:

1. Inter-group conflict and conflict resolution (*e.g.*, inter-racial conflict, inter-religious conflict, and inter-nation conflict).
2. Inter-group collaboration, particularly modes and forms of inter-nation collaboration.
3. Inter-group violence.
4. International trade, foreign aid, and foreign investment.
5. International migration.
6. International communication.
7. The formation of in-group/out-group attitudes and images.
8. Foreign policy decision-making.
9. Cultural diffusion.
10. Economic and political development (modernization).

C. Developing students' understanding of the international social system implies developing students' understanding of major international social problems. These include:

1. The control of inter-group violence and the peaceful resolution of conflict.
2. The control of population growth.
3. Increasing the wealth, education, health, and power (capacity to participate in or influence social decisions that affect one's life) of the developing two-thirds of global society.

4. Limiting or reducing the social and psychological costs of world-wide urbanization, technological change, and the development of large-scale, highly bureaucratized social organizations, both private and public.
5. Limiting and controlling the further deterioration in the human environment in the biosphere -- that thin layer of earth, water, and air that supports all life.

Dimensions of international understanding. The process of education is in part a process of transmitting information between and among human beings, but of course it is more than this. Beyond expanding the fund of mentally stored information available to students, what effects should world affairs education have upon their perceptions and valuations of the world?

Existing literature plus conversations with many educators and social scientists suggest the following model of general purposes and more specific objectives. Again the model is a "branching" model with each element implying the development of specific attitudes, skills, "understandings," etc.

I. The curriculum should develop students' world-mindedness. Many of us talk about developing "world-minded" students in much the same way that some of the New Left talk about developing a "revolutionalized" society. We all seem reluctant to pause talking long enough to define what we have in mind. This omission of definition is understandable enough since the task of conceptualizing "world-mindedness" is a prodigious undertaking and also a frustrating one since even our best efforts always fall embarassingly short of the mark. In a general sense "world-mindedness" would seem to refer to a generalized ability to perceive the world as a whole and hence to see one's own position in time and space from the perspective of the world system as a whole. The cultivation of an ability to adopt such a world-centered perspective would seem to imply developing within students a capacity to:

A. Partially transcend ethnocentrism by being able to view or perceive the world from a global perspective; to see ourselves, our nation, and our species as they might be seen by an observer in outer space.

B. Partially transcend ethnocentrism by being able to sympathetically perceive the actions of others and to empathetically understand human institutions, cultural beliefs, perceptions, and life situations different from one's own.

C. Recognize that some degree of ethnocentric bias and cultural distortion is inherent in all perceptions and beliefs about the world.

D. Existentially define oneself as a human animal and identify with the species _qua_ species and with the larger system of life.

E. Perceive commonalities in the basic needs of culturally diverse individuals, similarities in the functioning of structurally different social institutions and analogies or parallels in the historical experience of different societies or groups.

F. Experience multiple loyalties; to define oneself as a responsible member of many kinds of human groups.

II. _The curriculum should develop the capacity of students to discriminantly consume and critically process information about their world environment_. This would seem to imply developing within students a capacity to:

A. Think conceptually and comparatively about different objects within the world environment, _e.g._, about different societies, about historical and current events, about social processes such as conflict and cooperation, etc.

B. Formulate and test hypotheses and theories about international phenomena using the methods and skills associated with historical scholarship and social scientific inquiry; e.g., an ability to discriminate among different types of statements, an ability to state beliefs in propositional forms, an ability to make inferences, etc.

C. Analyze normative arguments or value claims and make the values underlying one's own judgments explicit.

D. Critically analyze and judge the actions or decisions of organized groups in international society and especially the foreign policy decisions of one's own government.

E. Discriminantly consume and critically evaluate information about international developments coming from mass media and inter-personal communications, e.g., to identify unwarranted inferences, to partially compensate for known biases and unreliabilities, etc.

F. Emotionally tolerate ambiguous and conflicting information.

III. The curriculum should develop the capacity of students intellectually and emotionally to cope with continuous change and marked diversity in their world environment. This would seem to imply developing within students a capacity:

A. To perceive diversity and change as a natural or inevitable feature of the human condition and to be able to consider many changes and a great deal of human diversity to be both socially desirable and personally "fun to live with."

B. To judge differences between and change within social instititions in terms of criteria derived from the premise that social institutions exist in order to satisfy human needs and hence are to be judged in terms of how well or poorly they succeed in doing this.

C. For continuous learning and for independent study outside of the classroom and beyond the years of formal education.

IV. The curriculum should develop the capacity of students to accept and constructively cope with "the realities of the human condition." Undoubtedly this implies many things, but clearly included are a capacity to:

A. Constructively live with continuing hostility and conflict within the world community.

(It was once widely believed that increased human contact would lead to increased human understanding and increased human understanding in turn would lead to reduced human conflict. One suspects that this bit of "peace theory" might have been first derived from personal observations of the relationships within families and among individuals; but when applied to the human family as a whole and the newly acquired intimacy of spaceship earth, it doesn't necessarily hold true. As someone has pointed out, many American G.I.'s went to France with sentimental and friendly feelings toward Frenchmen and returned home equally sentimental but considerably less friendly; and one suspects the same is true of many Frenchmen who come to America. It is very likely that the more we rub elbows the greater will be the friction within global society. Thus it would seem that we must prepare young people to live constructively in a relatively hostile world in which the central problem of their time will not be the elimination of human conflict, but the less messianic job of building both within and between nations new institutions through which to control and manage violence.)

B. Accept limited and perhaps relatively decreasing national power.

C. Accept the moral and policy implications of mankind's growing interdependence; for example, to recognize that vast inequalities in the distribution of such human values as wealth, health, education, and respect are incapable of moral justification, and to accept the necessity for social policy aimed at reducing the gap between the rich and the poor both within and among nations.

Summary. This essay has been an attempt to examine two issues central in planning and developing future curriculum: How might we fruitfully define international education so as to reflect the realities of the world into which our students have been born? What might we fruitfully consider to be the kinds of effects that the curriculum ought to have upon our students?

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# SOME PROBLEMS IN IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

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Education can liberate or imprison. Much that is called international education is of the latter kind. Images of the world of the past and preoccupation with certain current events filter out much of the world of the present. This almost makes it impossible to think realistically about the future. Several problems stand out as causes of our inability to grapple effectively with international education of the kind needed for our students to live productive adult lives in the Twenty-First Century.

## Preoccupation with United States Foreign Policy

Much of what is taught about international relations is done in the context of United States foreign policy on certain issues of great concern to the United States. This gives students a view of the world as perceived from one nation -- and a very large one. A way must be found to put these issues in the context of the whole, as several of the papers in this issue of Social Education indicate. This will require a curriculum that views the total system -- not only from a vantage point outside of a specific nation, but also from a vantage point outside the nation system itself.

## Problems of Change

The world is undergoing rapid change. How we study the world also is changing rapidly. This sets the basic context for thinking about the international education of children and adolescents.

Many of us are tired of hearing cliches about change. We are familiar with population curves that reveal that world population has risen from

0.5 billion in 1650 to 2.5 billion in 1950, a five-fold increase in three hundred years. It no longer seems startling to be told that this 2.5 billion will double before 1990. We are familiar with similar curves for speeds in intercontinental travel, rising from 25 to 1000 miles an hour in less than a century. Also familiar is the steep curve showing the destructiveness of weapons. But familiarity with a few statistics on change is one thing and adequate response is quite another. International education curriculum has not yet adequately taken into account the potential consequences for the United States, and for the nation system itself, of dramatic changes in population, transportation, and the destructive power of weapons.

In international relations we have exhibited often a tendency to take change into account only up to the present time and to assume implicitly that the world will continue without further change. Our adaptation to the bipolar world is an example of such behavior. Taking into account the rapid changes in international relations that followed World War II, many writers, often implicitly rather than explicitly, tended to assume that this pattern would prevail -- if not forever, at least for a long time. While focusing on the Cold War aspects of a bipolar world, often we have been unable to perceive fundamental changes taking place elsewhere, particularly in the new nations. As we approach the end of a century, there seem to be a number of efforts to make predictions for the next thirty-two years. This may be a sign that we are now developing the capacity to handle future change as well as that of the past. All international curricula should include discussion and prediction of the future.

Accordingly, each course and each textbook ought to include sections on the future, including specific predictions. Subsequent courses and textbooks should then analyze these predictions, in order to learn the causes of error.

Predictions should include descriptions of expected technological change and changes to be expected in human behavior, such as travel, communication, use of leisure, etc. These changes should be examined in terms of the agenda of problems they will produce and the problem-solving institutions that will be required to handle these problems.

Students might be encouraged to design alternative international institutions to handle problems that they anticipate will be important on future agendas, such as pollution of the seas, militarization of the seabed, and wars over claims to the resources on the seabed. These could be designed in problem papers or in simulations. This might prevent images of the problems and institutions of today, and yesterday, from imprisoning the minds of those whom we are trying to prepare to anticipate the problems of the future and to design institutions to solve them.

The simultaneous occurrence of the twentieth century revolution in social science compounds the difficulty of curriculum development in international education. This includes not only radical change in methods of data collection and analysis but application of theory across fields formerly isolated from each other -- for example, application of the same integration theory to both metropolitan and international politics. Thus, customary divisions of knowledge are being rejected, with important consequences for curriculum planning.

It will become increasingly difficult to plan an international education curriculum separately from other curricula. It is now not uncommon to hear discussions of violence that include both domestic and international phenomena. In discussion of problems created by the division of societies into the rich and the poor there are increasing references to both national and international examples. Furthermore, rigorous analysis is causing us to define more precisely our terms, including terms such as nation, which we apply customarily to such divergent entities as the United States, the Congo and Malta. Developing theory and precision in definition may produce, therefore, divisions of knowledge that cut across our customary international relations category.

Continuing change in both the world we study and in the way we study it are important considerations for curriculum planning in international education. Not only must international change be a key concern in the curriculum, the curriculum itself must have a built-in capacity to change. A curriculum that might be regarded as perfect today may be a distinct liability tomorrow without built-in provisions for taking into account changes in the world, changes in analytic techniques, and the development or refinement of theory.

## Problems of "Self-Analysis"

National loyalty is not the only kind of loyalty to inhibit realistic analysis of social issues but its effect may be the greatest. The strong moral tone of United States foreign policy objectives appears to generate an extreme self-righteousness that inhibits detached evaluation of United States performance by its citizens. This phenomenon is quite evident, for example, in attitudes of citizens -- and many officials -- toward United States performance in the United Nations. United States policy statements, opinion polls and the like reveal that the United States supports the United Nations with great moral fervor. But United States performance tends not to be carefully measured against this standard. It is generally assumed that the United States lives up to these moral principles. Different standards are applied in evaluating United Nations statements by "us" than are applied in evaluating statements by "them." For example, speeches by "them" are often treated as"nothing but propaganda," while speeches by "us" tend not to be labelled in this way. "We" may be different, but students tend not to be encouraged to take an analytic posture that will enable them to find out for sure.

While teachers develop more explicit and effective techniques enabling students to make detached analyses of international relations situations in which the United States is involved, they need not destroy nationalism and loyalty to country any more than as a child learns that his parents are fallible, he need love them less.

The student would learn, then, a new role -- that of detached observer and analyst, consciously separate from the role of loyal citizen. One very useful beginning technique for encouraging an analytic posture is to abolish use of the pronoun "we" in the classroom when reference is being made to a nation or groups of nations. Students should be assigned tasks of policy evaluation according to certain prescribed standards either chosen by them or assigned.

### The Big Nation Syndrome

Self-analysis may be more difficult in a giant nation, where most citizens are distant from any border, use only one language, and where most citizens get virtually all of their information from media produced by their nation. Considering what is to be found on the newsstands of many European cities, the differences between the Chicago Sun Times and the Chicago Tribune seem insignificant. Most American organizations are so big and consume so much energy in coordinating and running themselves that they have little time or energy to devote to foreign counterparts. However, in smaller nations more citizens are near a neighboring country and less satisfied with and dependent upon national media. National organizations are less able to serve fully the activity and information sought by members.

It is necessary that teachers make students self-conscious of the constraints that life in a big nation places upon information from abroad and opportunity for foreign experience. This should include efforts to provide sensitivity to the perception of big nations by small nations. For example, United States citizens are very concerned about the fact that they have only one vote in the United Nations, although they provide forty percent of its income and are a superpower. But it is important for Americans to empathize with the feeling of powerlessness to shape events that citizens of small powers have and their feeling that their nation often must cast its vote the way a superpower dictates. In addition it is necessary for citizens of big powers to be sensitive to differing standards for measuring contributions to international enterprises. For example, although most Americans are disturbed that their nation -- only one of over 120 nations in the United Nations -- contributes forty percent of the budgets of the United Nations family, most do not know that the United States ranks twentieth in per capita contributions to the United Nations.

## The "Nation" as an Analytic Blinder

The maps with national boundaries from which we initially learn about the world generate assumptions about human behavior from which it is difficult to free ourselves in thinking about both actual and potential patterns of global behavior. There are linguistic maps, occupational maps, physical maps, etc., but none shapes our view of the world so much as the political map. Our view of the importance of nations also is affected by the way in which various actors use national symbols. For example, in hundreds of agencies around the world individuals are speaking with signs in front of them saying "United States." Although they resresent different agencies of government, and even though they often contradict each other, we tend to treat them as though they were all one person.

Arnold Wolfers points effectively, however, to phenomena overlooked by this perspective:

> Some democratic states have exhibited such pluralistic tendencies that they offer to the world a picture of near-anarchy. They seem to speak to the world with many and conflicting voices and to act as if one hand -- agency or faction -- does not know what the other hand is doing..../In/ some...new states...integration is so poor that other states must deal with parts, rather than with a fictitious whole, if diplomacy is to be effective.[1]

Wolfers' observations raise serious questions about our tendency to treat nations as single actors. For example, on the basis of whatever definition of "major" we might choose, does it make any difference how many major individual actors nation "X" has in the system at one time? Does it make any difference where they are located and to what kinds of issues they are assigned? Would other nations be more effective if they deal with the United States as one actor or would they be more effective if they relate to the United States as a number of actors? To what extent was a United States revealed in the events of the U-2 affair? When the officials of a nation involved in international relations are numbered in the thousands and sometimes tens of thousands, and are in all parts of the globe, coordination of their activity into something resembling that af a single actor may be a goal but it is only partially realized. The difference between the goal and degree of achievement may be a significant factor in international relations.

The political map also may influence our lack of attention to non-territorial groups and organizations that cut across national boundaries. For example, why have we neglected to include international business corporations in our international studies? Some have more influence on international relations than many international organizations and nations about which we require our students to learn. Some have annual budgets that surpass the total budgets of all inter-governmental and nongovernmental international organizations, and also surpass the budgets of many nations. Corporations such as Shell, Nestle, Coca Cola, and IBM are encountered around the world. Some international corporations hvve activities in, and officials from, so many nations that it is difficult to assign them a single nationality.

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[1] Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959) p. 102.

## Inadequate Models of World Order

When people think about the desirability of peace in the international system, they tend to base their thinking on analogies from experience in their own nations. If they live in a reasonably peaceful nation with a strong central government, such as the United States, they tend to believe that it is the government that is responsible for peace. Therefore they believe that we cannot have world peace without world government; and they also tend to believe that this government ought to look something like their own government. But this line of reasoning overlooks the possibility that national governments are as much a result of already existing peaceful conditions as a cause of such conditions. It also does not take into account the likelihood that world government would develop out of the melding of a variety of governmental patterns and international conditions rather than follow the customs of any one nation. Furthermore, the assumptions that a world government is necessary for world peace neglects the fact that many nations have had peaceful relations, in the present as well as in the past, without world governmental institutions.

Whatever formal intergovernmental institutions might be deemed necessary to achieve a desired kind of international community, there are indications that researchers and prophets should be paying more attention to international non-governmental and business organizations. The role of nongovernmental groups in the domestic political system of nation-states may be suggestive of their meaning at the international level. For example, recent research on developing nations has tended to emphasize the importance of social organizations to the development of a viable political system. Almond and Coleman[2] in The Politics of the Developing Areas stressed the importance of nongovernmental groups -- labor and business organizations, political pressure groups, etc. -- that link individual wants to governmental decision-making. Without such a political process, in which nongovernmental groups are crucial, even the best of governmental institutions may not be able to perform this vital role in a society.

It is reasonable to think of nongovernmental international organizations as having the potential for fulfilling the same function in the international system. Indeed, Haas has drawn attention to the way in which trade associations and trade unions in Europe have organized across national lines in order to lobby for their interests in the European Economic Community.[3] For example, the steel producers throughout the Community have organized in order to lobby in the EEC institutions against some of the pleas of a similar organization developed by steel worlers. In this way controversy over certain economic issues is transformed from conflict between nations to conflict between international groups. The EEC institutions become more vital as they become the arena in which such disputes are waged and sometimes resolved.

Which Agency Can Handle the Problem?

The key problem in local, national, and international politics is deciding which agency can best handle a problem. Sometimes an agency is given a task without adequate thought about the appropriateness of the task for the agency. An example, would be the attempt by the Department of Defense to sponsor a large-scale social science research project in foreign affairs called Project Camelot.[4] Some think that national military establishments, particularly their nuclear arsenals, such as those built by the United States and the Soviet Union, do not serve their intended goal -- peace -- as well as other kinds of military forces or entirely different kinds of institutions.

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[2] Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[3] Ernst Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," International Organization XII, 1958, pp. 440-458.

Students can see near their homes how agencies once adequate for certain jobs are no longer effective. This is particularly obvious in metropolitan areas where separate communities must band together, creating new agencies for handling police, transportation, or sewage disposal. Those who live on the Canadian border may be aware of the numerous agencies that perform functions that cut across the U.S.-Canadian border, and may become sensitive to the limitations of strictly national institutions for handling some problems. But most of us tend to accept the performance of functions by the nation without ever pondering whether international agencies might perform them more effectively. Although it is often asserted that international organizations can implement more effectively technical assistance programs, they are still minute compared to bilateral programs. The slight use of international agencies is reflected in the total annual budgets of the United Nations and all the specialized agencies: $580,000,000. This is less than the budget of many United States corporations and is, indeed, small when compared to the U.S. annual budget of some $30,000,000,000 for Vietnam.

If policy makers are to have the flexibility they need in assigning problems to international agencies and in creating new agencies when needed, it will be necessary for international education to encourage future citizens and future policy makers to focus more on problems and less on institutions.

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[4] Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, (Cambridge, Mass., Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1967).

It is our present tendency to teach how certain institutions -- community government, national government, the United Nations, etc. -- handle already assigned functions. Curriculum could be organized around problems in such a way that it highlights more effectively the shortcomings of institutions and, most importantly, emphasizes problems for which no effective decisional unit exists. This might enable students to develop habits of problem allocation that are based less on emotional loyalties -- such as loyalties to city and nation -- and more on the basis of criteria dictated by effective problem solving.

## A View of the World Agenda

In planning international education for the coming decades the United States can gain valuable experience by assessing the failure of education during the past several decades to prepare its citizens for the problems of social change the United States is facing today. Why do so many Americans think the answer to violence in Watts, Detroit, Chicago, and Newark is better police? Why do they look to military power to solve problems in Vietnam? Why do they look upon the United Nations primarily as a peacekeeping agency? Do they realize that the citizens of most nations are more anxious about what the United Nations can do to give them better food, shelter, and clothing than they are about the improvement of U.N. peacekeeping forces?

Part of the difficulty in handling both domestic and international violence is our inflated notion of the capability of military and police forces to produce order. This has been discussed already above. But another part of the difficulty is caused by the limited knowledge that policy makers and citizens have of the total agenda of problems of national and international societies. Even the white liberals most sensitive to the problems of the blacks are only beginning to appreciate fully the total impact of segregation on the blacks in terms of deprivation of education, jobs, equal justice, etc. Many Americans still believe that corrective action is simply rewarding the undeserving and lazy. They look in the same way upon pleas on the part of the deprived nations in international assemblies.

It is vital that international education place the things that the United States most wants from its international activities -- mainly peace and stability -- in the context of the wants of all mankind. What is the composite agenda of items that people around the world believe ought to be handled by some kind of international activity or international agency? The varying hierarchies of priority around the world ought to be portrayed vividly. How well are agencies such as the United Nations doing in regard to these felt needs? Why are they doing so very little? Will lack of achievement internationally, which seems to be paralleling past lack of achievement nationally, bring results similar to Watts.

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# ENLARGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPONENT OF THE HIGH SCHOOL SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM

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Ask almost any elementary school student to name the four cardinal directions on a compass, and he will respond: North, East, South, and West. Unlike the Chinese, we do not include a fifth direction, "right here where I am standing." Even so, perhaps in the process of pointing out the four directions we are placing ourselves in the center of the universe. And just perhaps, in part at least, it was a similar geographical orientation that led the Chinese to label their homeland the "Middle Kingdom" and caused Englishmen to divide Asia into "Near East," "Middle East," and "Far East" according to the relative distance from England.

It is a highly significant truism that what is "east" and what is "west" -- as well as what is "up" or "down" -- depends upon where one is standing. There is an effort under way in the elementary grades to make directions conform more to scientific practices. Asking children to learn that "north" is in the direction of the North Pole instead of away from where they are standing, that "east" is in the direction that the earth spins on its axis, and the "west" is in the direction counter to the spin of planet earth helps to restructure children's perception of their place in the universe.

The other side of the coin from a self-centered orientation is to view other peoples as less important, even inferior. The classical Romans referred to those who did not accept Roman rule and culture as "barbarians." The Carib Indians assert, "We alone are people." The Scandinavian Lapps use the term "human being" to refer only to themselves. The Old Testament indicates that Jews have a special status in the eyes of God. The Nazis claimed that Aryans were a master race and Jews were to be despised.

While most people may not despise other groups, they do tend to look upon their own as best and judge others by their own standards. Lambert and Klineberg found this ethnocentrism present in all the young people they studied.[1] And Goodman found the process of attitude formation about self, including group identification, in progress by age four in the children she observed.[2]

Ethnocentrism involves not only national self-identification but sub-groups within nations. For example, many Americans are not only suspicious of "Foreigners" but are also suspicious of those Americans who live, speak, believe and look differently from themselves. Evidence of this is the many derisive terms Americans use to refer to each other, including "city slicker," "beatnik," "hillbilly," "nigger," "wop," "kike," and "honkie."

Although it seems clear that part of being human is to identify with a group, it is equally clear that rigid ethnocentrism impedes the formulation of attitudes and perceptions that are necessary for understanding among peoples across national boundaries. For national groups to perceive each other accurately and with understanding may have been a "luxury" the world could do without at the time of the Middle Kingdom in China, but in the nuclear age, when annihilation of the human species may be the result of misperception, it is a necessity. What can be done about the more dangerous forms of ethnocentrism?

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[1] Wallace E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, Children's Views of Foreign Peoples. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967.)

[2] Mary Ellen Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Children. (New York, Collier Books, 1964.)

Research into attitudes, values, and beliefs suggests a strong, inverse relationship between education and ethnocentrism. While it is difficult to isolate education from other variables, such as socio-economic class, it is possible to assert that the best-educated of any population tend to be the least ethnocentric. Although men learn from their social environment to adopt highly positive attitudes toward their own social group, through formal education they can acquire a somewhat more balanced perspective of their own group and greater appreciation for other social groups. Put differently, education can and does enable human beings to broaden their perceptions of the behavior of others as well as their own.

Students can begin to understand the world scene as described by the various articles in this issue of *Social Education* if teachers are prepared to alter attitudes and impose concepts of the kind needed for planetary perception. Unfortunately, many social studies teachers and specialists squirm when education is defined as a process to change student's behavior. Unlike most mathematics teachers who expect to impose math concepts and influence attitudes toward mathematics, many social studies teachers draw back from what, in effect, amounts to breaking a monopolistic hold of localist and nationalist attitudes and cognitions. With the goals of international education uncertain, teachers are content to let each student "do his own thing."

Indeed, many social studies teachers, perhaps a majority, conceive their role as that of confirming and supporting the prevailing attitudes and perceptions of the community served by the school, whether in Alabama or Vermont. To conceive the social studies teachers' role as one of changing attitudes and imposing views not already held by the community is not the most certain path to advancement and popular endorsement. But, that is the task. To do less than this is to allow an increasing gap between education and world reality.

In what follows I have tried to suggest a few ways that teachers might encourage a more planetary perception within existing high school social studies courses. I have not sought to conceive entirely new courses because this seems futile at this stage and would probably reach few students. Nor have I sought to suggest changes that might be made in all the courses currently available to high school students. Rather, I have chosen to emphasize possible changes in those courses that are commonly taught and that are usually ethnocentric: 1. American History and 2. Civics, which we take here to include American Government and American Problems.

Finally, the comments that follow are suggestive rather than exhaustive. For example, no attempt has been made to redesign the American History course; instead, the effort here is merely to suggest some points that might be helpful for readers who wish to build an international component into their existing courses. Throughout, an attempt has been made to apply concepts suggested by the various papers in this issue of Social Education, without in each case referring back to the specific author or the page on which the idea can be found.

American History:

Suppose you were to give the following anecdote to a class of high school juniors. How do you think they would respond?

Identify the nation being described:

> "This nation came into existence as a result of a war of national liberation in which it successfully won its independence from a colonial power. Not all citizens of the new nation had supported the war. Many who had opposed it fled the country to protect their lives.

The first political leader was the general who had successfully led the revolutionary army. He was very popular with the masses and had great influence on government policies.

"The new nation tried to follow a neutralist policy in foreign affairs. It avoided military alliances, while seeking to trade with and secure aid from all the Great Powers. Meanwhile, it attempted to spread its ideology and supported colonial revolts whenever possible. It did not hesitate to annex territory by treaty and by war; it oppressed its own minority groups; and it looked for ways to limit political opposition at home."

Few students will guess that the anecdote describes the United States, because it is couched in terms more often used to describe new nations today. Students recognize George Washington as the "father of his country" but are unlikely to perceive him as the charismatic, military leader who was the most "available" of all the revolutionary leaders to lead the new nation. Students normally think of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as "Great Powers"; they do not recognize that less than 200 years ago the United States was a small power buffeted by "Great Powers," France and England.

The point of the anecdote is that the meaning a person derives from his observation depends in large measure upon the images in his mind. Since high school juniors learn to view United States history as the unique experience of a unique people, they are unprepared to consider United States history in terms of the mainstream of world history. Of course, United States history, as is true of the history of any group of people is unique. There was only one George Washington or only one Declarlation of Independence in 1776. Nevertheless, treating U.S. history as only a unique experience prevents a student from recognizing that in general, and often in more fundamental ways, the history of his nation is very similar to that of other nations. Other nations in different parts of the world had similar, if not identical experiences. Some were also settled by Europeans who exerted political domination over indigenous populations. While the length and style of colonial experience has varied from one nation to another, the vast majority have gained independent status.

It is hardly surprising that American national history has lacked a planetary perspective. As is true with national histories of other nations, United States history is generally taught so as to build pride and loyalty in what is American, not in what Americans share with other peoples of the world. Even this goal has not been met successfully, since we have become increasingly aware that American history as generally taught has been primarily the history of American white people. All minority groups have been victims of bias, distortion, and omission, in most school textbooks. For example, the expansion of the United States to the southwest and west in the 1840's is often treated as the inevitable, natural right of an advanced people instead of a violation of both international law and the sovereign rights of Mexico.

In The Historian's Contribution to Anglo-American Misunderstanding,[3] Ray Billington and a team of American, Canadian, and English historians describe the results of their investigation into national bias in English, Canadian, and American history textbooks. They found much to criticize in the textbooks of the three countries. Myths and folk-tales that have long been discredited continue to be reported as fact. Some textbook authors exaggerate the military victories, heroism and valor of their own citizens, play down the efforts of allied nations, and stress the dastardly deeds of opponents. Contributions made by citizens of other nations to joint projects or to furthering the welfare of mankind are overlooked, while the efforts of nationals are presented out of proportion to their real contribution. The result of such distortions in history teaching is to promote ethnocentric attitudes and perceptions among American, Canadian, and English youth.

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[3] Ray Allen Billington and others, The Historian's Contribution to Anglo-American Misunderstanding: Report of a Committee on National Bias in Anglo-American History Textbooks. (London, Hobbs Dorman, and Co., Inc., 1966.)

One effort currently under way to counter this tendency is the International Textbook Project.[4] This project, jointly sponsored by Phi Delta Kappa, the National Council for the Social Studies, and the Service Center for Teachers of History of the American Historical Association and drawing on the support of a number of scholars from the United States and abroad, will produce a book of translations from textbooks of other countries that is intended to be used as a supplementary text for high school courses in American history. Tentatively titled, How Others See Us and soon to be published by Houghton Mifflin, it contains selections from the secondary school history textbooks of 34 nations. The various selections have been translated, edited, and selected to match key topics in American history. Students can learn, for example, what Mexican textbooks say about the Mexican War or what Panamanian and Colombian Textbooks contain about the building of the Panama Canal.

The sponsors of the Project hope that American students will become more conscious of examples of national bias and distortion in their own textbooks; in addition, the book may contribute to new perceptions by students regarding the role of the United States in world affairs. One example is the following selection from a chapter on American culture from a French textbook:

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[4] I am grateful to Donald Robinson, director and editor of the Project, for permitting me to study portions of the book in draft form.

> "...The ascension of the United States to first rank is accompanied by a progression of their influence in the hierarchy of values in civilization. They are taking a more and more active part in the building of western civilization of which they are now one of the centers. But this is not all. The current of exchange between Europe and America has been reversed in several fields; while over a period of some centuries America looked to Europe for inspiration, for models, it often happens today that the initiative comes from beyond the Atlantic: for the cinema, the novel, the theatre, architecture, sociology, the humanities, or the natural sciences, the techniques of production or the arrangement of daily living, for "style of life," American civilization is in process of becoming a model the attraction of which does not cease to grow beyond the frontiers of the American union . . . . The eventuality that American civilization may become one day the universal civilization is not at all inconceivable."

One can only speculate what influence quotes such as these might have on the perceptions of American high school students. It could further an attitude of superiority. It may open a student's eyes enabling him to see the degree to which his nation and national culture have become part of the world experience. Or it may enable the student to understand European fears of the "Americanization" of their cultures.

Perhaps, one of the most important contributions American history teachers can make to helping students understand the nature of the contemporary world is by avoiding the temptation to overstress the uniformity in contemporary American culture. The fact is that there is not one American life-style today, if there ever was. Some Americans today live truly an international existence. As Robert Harper has stated elsewhere in this journal, there are today two perspectives of human life: one, a traditional locally-based culture, the other, a new world-wide interconnected system. In the first people continue to draw their sustenance locally and do not travel far from home. Their contact with the outside world is via television, newspapers, and magazines. Much of what they see seems strange and threatening. Other Americans are already full participants in the second -- the world-wide interconnected system. They are equally at home in London, Tokyo, Paris or New York. They have friends and colleagues scattered in nations all across the planet. Events abroad touch them as quickly and significantly as to events within the United States.

In many ways these two groups of Americans have little in common beyond their loyalty and pride in the same national state. Their life-styles are different; their perceptions of the world are dissimilar. The first is likely to be highly ethnocentric; the latter impatient with his more backward cousin. Each group should learn about the other. American history courses tend to serve and to describe primarily the traditional, locally-based clients of the schools. This is true not only because of past tradition but because these clients presently constitute a majority. Nevertheless, the task of education is not primarily a process of informing a student about himself, but it is essentially revealing to him what he is not and what he is in the process of becoming. Because the adult experience of many, perhaps most, American youth will be rooted in two cultures -- one international the other local -- it is important that American history teachers begin to provide instruction relating to the attitudes and views that life in the two cultures will require.

Civics:

Probably the single, most frequently stated social studies objective is "to prepare students for responsible citizenship." Every social studies course in the curriculum is presumed to contribute to this goal in some manner. Nevertheless, three high school social studies courses have been viewed as having a special responsibility for citizenship education. These courses are Civics (usually offered at the ninth grade), American Government (either an eleventh or twelfth grade course), and American Problems (primarily a twelfth grade course). While other courses, including International Relations, Economics and Comparative Politics, also exist, they are offered less frequently and reach many fewer students. Therefore, this section is devoted to the three courses that carry a particular burden for citizenship education.

Earlier in the century when a smaller percentage of students completed high school, the ninth-grade course in Civics was viewed as an opportunity to provide citizenship training for those who would be unlikely to receive additional formal education. (In some cities it continues to serve this function, as college-preparatory students are often assigned to courses other than Civics.) Civics courses informed youngsters about their political system and inducted them into the political culture. In part the course served as an "Americanization" course for children of immigrant families who were crowding into the schools during the first third of the twentieth century.

Over the years the Civics course has changed. Since becoming a citizen came to be recognized as a multi-faceted endeavor, Civics became the opportunity to teach health, vocational guidance, driver's education, consumer economics, as well as important data about local, state, and national government. The resultant clutter that marked many ninth-grade Civics courses, the decline in the relative importance of socializing first generation Americans and the increased length of time students spend in schools have combined to bring a decline in status of ninth-grade Civics instruction. In some schools Civics has been replaced by World Geography or World History; in other schools many students no longer enroll in a social studies course at the ninth grade level but substitute courses in science, math, or foreign languages.

The need to change or improve what is currently being done in Ninth-grade Civics can hardly be denied. Research by social scientists on the topic of political socialization suggests that much of what is currently taught in ninth-grade Civics is already possessed by students prior to taking the course. Therefore, Civics instruction is frequently redundant.[5]

This is not to suggest that Civics instruction is necessarily doomed at the ninth grade; it does suggest that the Civics course may require remodeling. Certainly a course designed to teach youngsters what it means to be an American is no longer necessary when they already possess knowledge about the political system and are fully committed to the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the American political culture.

It might be argued that an entirely new "citizenship" course is required because an entirely new form of citizenship is beginning to appear. If one can begin to talk seriously about planetary citizenship, it may be that the Civics course that once served to inculcate the American political culture to foreign born can be reconstituted to prepare ethnocentric Americans for the responsibilities of planetary citizenship.

What the nature of such a course might be is not clear, for the values and knowledge that will be required to function as a citizen of the world are not clear. But, if it can be agreed that the need exists, it is not too much to ask schools to begin addressing themselves to that need.

Some efforts are already under way that offer some hope, although no one is prepared to label them answers to the problem. At Carnegie-Mellon University, Edwin Fenton and his colleagues have developed a two-semester sequence for the ninth grade consisting of one semester of Comparative Political Systems and a second semester on Comparative Economic Systems. Students learn about "primitive" (non-modern), Soviet and American political and economic systems through an examination of fundamental, analytical questions such as, "Who are the political leaders and how are they recruited? How are decisions made in the society? Who decides what goods will be produced, how goods will be produced and for whom?" Questions such as these are transferable to other political and economic systems, thereby preventing students from becoming culture-bound in political and economic investigations.

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[5] For a summary of political socialization research with implications for secondary school social studies curriculum, see John J. Patrick, *Political Socialization of American Youth: A Review of Research With Implications for Secondary School Social Studies*. (Washington, D.C., National Council for the Social Studies, 1967.)

The High School Curriculum Center in Government at Indiana University has under development a two-semester course in American Political Behavior for use in the ninth grade. While the course focuses on the political behavior of Americans, the social science concepts upon which the course is constructed are presumably neutral and can be applied to other political systems.

Much of what has been written earlier about the ninth-grade Civics course applies equally to the twelfth-grade course in American Government. In fact, one of the recurring problems has been how to eliminate the overlap between the two courses. For the most part the twelfth-grade government course has tended to concentrate on the legal institutions of the American political system. It has been primarily, as its name implies, a study of government rather than political science.

In an effort to remove the overlap between the ninth and twelfth-grade courses, the High School Curriculum Center in Government at Indiana University intends to complement its ninth-grade course in American Political Behavior (a micro-political approach focusing on the behavior of individuals) with a twelfth-grade course in American and Comparative Political Systems (a macro-political approach focusing on the functions of systems). During the first semester of the twelfth-grade course students will acquire a model for studying any political system while studying the operations of the American political system. During the second semester they will apply the model to the political systems of three other nation-states: England, the Soviet Union, and one non-modern nation. Presumably, this two-semester course will not only provide students with a number of concepts they can utilize in the study of any political system, but it will also provide them with knowledge about three contemporary political systems in addition to their own.

The American Problems course often serves as an alternate or substitute for the twelfth-grade government course. While it frequently includes a treatment of the American political system, it differs from the typical government course in that much of its content is directed toward certain important social, economic, and political problems that affect Americans today. For the most part the focus is on domestic problems; for example, urbanization, civil rights, and air and water pollution. Frequently the course treats international affairs, but this topic is often developed through the perspective of an "American problem."

What teachers of American Problems frequently fail to realize is that many of the problems they conceive to be American are indeed world problems and could be treated in that way. A "world problem" approach would provide a much broader perspective. For example, the difficulties arising out of urbanization are not unique to the United States. Moscow, Tokyo, London and Johannesburg as well as New York and Chicago are faced with the problem of how to provide services to an increasing multitude of people or how to quickly socialize rural migrants into an unfamiliar urban setting.

The problem of how minority groups are to be socialized into the society may assume racial overtones in the United States, Argentina or

South Africa, and ethnic overtones in Canada, Czechoslovakia, or the U.S.S.R. Whatever the source of discrimination, the essential question is the same: How can a minority group be accomodated within the society with equal rights and opportunities?

Just as cities and states have learned that air and water pollution problems cannot be solved locally but require the cooperation of many governmental units, so too nations are beginning to realize that all people share essentially the same physical environment. Nuclear fallout does not take place on the soil of only the nuclear powers. All nations are affected when the air is poisoned. Whether it is the conservation of the air breathed by all men or the conservation of ocean resources utilized by many nations, increasingly all peoples on the planet have a stake in the solution of the problem.

Finally, the most significant problem of all in our own time -- how to prevent a nuclear war -- is clearly an issue of concern to all mankind. A full-scale nuclear war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would not only mean the annihilation of the vast majority of these two nations, it could even make Earth a dead planet. It is impossible to view the question of nuclear war as a national problem; it can only be resolved by the wholehearted cooperation of all nations of the planet -- and should be treated in our secondary school social studies accordingly.

## In Conclusion:

The role of formal courses in the social studies includes one of providing students with concepts that enable them to see themselves, their society, and other peoples from a planetary perspective. It is not necessary to create entirely new courses to do the task. Curricular offerings can be reshaped to suit new purposes. Old courses are always in the process of change as a result of new ideas. This essay has tried to demonstrate that it is not necessary to install entirely new courses in order to build international perspectives into the social studies curriculum. All that is needed is for teachers and curriculum developers to begin to understand what the notion of a planetary society means. They will find an adequate number of opportunities to plug relevant concepts into existing courses, and students will begin to acquire some of the perspectives they will need to function as citizens of a world society.

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# A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE: TWO FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN-EARTH EQUATIONS AND THEIR JUXTAPOSITION

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Teachers would generally agree that the basic task of the social studies is to give students an understanding of the world in which they live -- not only the world of their personal lives, their families and communities, their country, but also of the larger world that lies behind the newspaper headlines and television news broadcasts. But the task of making sense out of a world in which three billion people live in a seemingly infinite variety of planetary variations is fantastically complex. What is most needed is some over-all frame of reference to bridge the gap between the individual's observable world and the more abstract planetary world.

The first step in providing an over-all framework is to look for the variables that are of major importance in explaining human activity whether at the local level or the global. The elements in the over-all equation we are seeking to identify are: (1) The nature of the individual, (2) the character of the group, society or culture within which he lives, (3) the earth environment within which the group lives, (4) the technological capacity of the group to make use of the environmental and cultural resources, and (5) the interrelations between the group at its particular location on the earth and other places and peoples. All inquiry within the social studies would seem to deal with one or more of these elements; and, to a large extent, all analysis of major questions involves the interrelations among them.

But to understand the world in which we live, whether viewed at the close range of family and community or the longest range of planet Earth, we still must have an over-all frame that will give us understanding of the interrelationship between man and his environment. For, in its simplest form, the human problem has been and will remain -- how to wrest the necessities of life from the environment. And from the dim beginnings of human existence this problem has been not only an individual matter but one for the larger group, the society.

## The Traditional Man-Earth Equation

Throughout pre- and early history, man's capacity for understanding and working with the earth environment was so limited by his technology that the focus of not only the individual's attention but that of the group was highly localized. The group did not have a global range or even a continental range. The problem of living was to figure out how to sustain life on the particular part of real estate that the group occupied, and the basic human instrument for using the particular local environment was the collective capacity of the group as it developed by trial and error and inspiration over time.

A social science of the world of man throughout most of man's history, then, has been the study of the many different societies or cultural groups, each living in its own particular piece of earth real estate. Each group could be studied in itself or in terms of particular aspects of its life; or groups, or particular aspects of life, could be studied comparatively from group to group. In either case, the world appears like mosaic tiles, each to be studied in terms of the man-environmental conditions within the tiles or to be compared and contrasted with other tiles.

Of course, even before man left written records the individual man-earth tiles were not completely separate. Difficult as movement over the earth was to primitive man, remarkable journeys were made. Individuals and parties moved between groups; and while they couldn't carry much in the way of goods, there was a traffic in ideas and in particularly valuable commodities -- seeds, plants, animals, and critical artifacts. But the inputs to any local community from outside, though often of fundamental significance, were still secondary to the basic problem of human life: how the group could wrest a better living from its distinctive earth environment.

Notice that we have established a basic conceptual framework for understanding human life on the earth. We have set down a descriptive model for relating the basic factors: individual, group, earth environment, technology, and interrelations between places. The frame makes more meaningful both the individual elements of the human equation and the interrelations that provide understanding of the whole. The task of analysis and description still is considerable, but there is a frame on which to build from the most minute ingredient in the over-all picture to a description of the whole.

The model of the equation of human life in the world that has just been described is readily recognized as one currently in vogue as an organizational frame for teaching the social sciences and social studies -- the "cultural area" or "culture world" approach. It assumes the world to be divided into separate divisions on the basis of different culture groups; and it focuses on the fundamental problem of each group, which is to live off of its particular piece of earth real estate using the know-how that has been developed within the social group itself.

The analysis of each culture group in its own little world reveals many variations in the equation: different degrees of know-how, different group values, and different earth environments. Comparison of one group with another is most interesting, for all sorts of similarities and differences can be found in the solution to the problems of life: there are important similarities between groups living in very different earth environments; yet there are also important differences between groups in very similar earth environments. All facets of human life -- value systems, economic activities, governmental organizations, social patterns -- can be held up for comparative study.

Such a model of the human equation is basic to an understanding of the rationale of most of human history, and it is also fundamentally relevant to understanding a very large segment of the population of the earth today. Because, today, for much of mankind -- in rural Asia, Latin America, and Africa and even in portions of Anglo-America, Europe and the Soviet Union -- the problem of life remains a locally-oriented one. It is the earth environment within the local area -- often within eyesight of home -- that must provide almost all of the basic needs of life. And, despite greater and greater inputs of ideas and technology from the rest of the world, it is still the know-how of the local group -- its culture and technology -- that determines how the problem of the use of local environment will be attacked.

## A Different Human Equation: The World-Wide Realm of Modern Life

The culture world approach has given us a model for understanding much of human history and a large segment of the earth's population today. Proponents of this approach to social sciences attribute its shortcomings to errors in teaching, not in the model itself. Thus, they chide us for our almost complete attention to only certain of the many culture worlds of man; namely, those of Western Man. Understanding of human relations will come, they infer, if we give "equal time" to other cultures.

But there is a fundamental difficulty in the culture world approach that cannot be solved by more attention to understanding the rationale of cultures other than our own, or even to more concern with comparison of different cultures. Large segments of today's world do not live according to the cultural-mosaic formula.

The model does not provide understanding of New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Peiping, or even the multitude of smaller urban communities in the world. None of these communities expects to support its population from the environmental resources of the local area.

For example, we cannot give students meaningful insight into the New York Metropolitan Area by describing the amount of high-rise office buildings built since World War II, counting the number of commuters entering Manhattan Island on a business day, or even describing the problems of ghetto life. Nor is New York today explicable even in terms of its people and their relations to the local resource base or the natural quality of the harbor, although even the promoters and builders of skyscrapers must take such matters into account.

New York must be seen for what it does rather than what it is -- and it does much more than provide goods and services for its fifteen million people. The banks and corporations with offices in those high towers are at the decision-making controls of two-way flows that, on the one hand, draw production from mines, plantations and farms, and factories at points throughout the world and, on the other hand, send finished goods and services not only throughout the United States but to centers in most parts of the world. The decisions of Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan Bank, J.C. Penney, Radio Corporation of America and New York Life come from Manhattan's office towers, and they, multiplied by the more than 300 other major corporations and financial institutions headquartered in New York, have impact in Buffalo; Muncie, Indiana; Carbondale, Illinois; London; Tokyo; or Calcutta.

The lives, then, of most people in the United States, in Europe, or in the Soviet Union are tied into long-range connections that extend out from metropolitan centers such as New York. And, we cannot understand the agriculture of the U.S. Corn Belt, the Argentine Pampas, the Latin American or African coffee plantation, or even the collective farms of the Soviet Union in terms of man and land as in the closed-society model. The land as a resource base is essential to the system in terms of mass-production from parts of the world that appear to offer the best sources of particular commodities within limits of a particular political and econcmic organization. But the production decisions are made in terms of markets around the world and regularly implemented with capital from thousands of miles away.

It is the complex interconnections of this modern system that give meaning to big metropolitan centers such as New York City, small communities such as Carbondale, Illinois, or primary producing areas in Indiana, Florida, or Australian grasslands.

Thus, there is a second very different man-earth equation in the world; one that had its origins in the limited inter-community contacts begun long ago and described as a secondary input factor in our local-base model. What made these contacts possible were long-range transportation and communication, enabling man to connect parts of the world separated by many miles. In the early stages of technology, caravan routes and, particularly, water routes -- both river highways and the oceans -- offered a possible alternative to the local-base solution to man's problem of living on earth. For over these routes goods, ideas, and people could move from one particular culture-tile to another. However, because man's technology was so primitive, very little could actually be carried between locally-based communities by human porters, animals, wagons or sail-powered vessels.

But the quantity of goods, people and ideas that could be moved long-distance were fantastically accelerated by the successive control and increased efficiency of inanimate energy sources -- first water, then coal, petroleum, natural gas, and now nuclear energy -- beginning with the Industrial Revolution 200 years ago. Later on the discovery of telegraph, telephone, radio and TV reduced the time factor between places.

The revolutions in transportation and communications resulted in the model of the man-earth equation that began with the European sea empires and has spread to Anglo-America, to the Soviet Union, and is found in Japan, Australia, and in bridgeheads of cities and commercial producing areas in almost every country of the world. This model depends not on man-land relations within a local area but rather on connections with other centers in a regional and, increasingly, a world-wide network. More and more, this model assumes mass consumption by persons throughout the system and specialized production in particular points within the system. Thus,each producing area has the possibility of supplying consumers throughout the system and, in turn, the producers have the possibility of consuming goods from any other point in the system.

The system radically varies the human equation, for no longer is the population of a particular point in the system bound by the limitations either of (1) the character of the earth environment at that point as a base of support, or (2) the limitations of the thought and technology of the particular culture group. Theoretically, all peoples within the system can draw the best of goods and ideas from any other part of the world-wide network. Thus, points throughout the earth environment form the production base for the system, and the collective know-how of all persons in the system provides the capacity to increase the understanding of the environment and its possible use. Know-how and technology developing within the system even offer the possibility of expanding beyond the limitations of the earth's crust to draw on other bodies in space.

As we have noted, this new world-wide system for supporting human life did not spring forth full-grown in the Twentieth Century. We know it evolved from the past and developed primarily from the Western European culture world. Perhaps the Roman Empire was an early attempt at such a system, but the equation took effective form first, probably, in the British Empire. And while that empire connected producing areas on all continents, it really organized only a tiny fraction of the possible earth resources. Other European countries developed their own intercontinental networks on a smaller scale; and the United States , a modified form of the European culture, also developed its own version of the new interconnected system by organizing the varied resources of a continent into a functioning whole and by strengthening its ties to Europe as well. Today, other examples of the interconnected model on varying scales can be seen in the organization of the Soviet Union and Japan. To an important degree, each country in today's world is trying to develop its own national resources and at the same time to tie into the increasingly developing world-wide connections. Thus, just as there were many variations on the locally-based culture world model, so are there numerous forms of the long-range interconnected system.

It could be argued that the new interconnected model, with its long-range connections that now are increasingly of global proportions, is just a larger-scale version of the traditional model: modern transportation has simply extended the range of the human resource base; instead of a walking distance from a locality that range is now global. But there are other differences as well. Traditionally we have thought of the locally-based culture in terms of the organization of contiguous territory -- the culture area, the political state, the economic region. But the British Empire with its connections across unoccupied seas presented the beginnings of point-to-point connections across gaps that were not a part of the system. Increasingly, the new interconnected system with its global scale is of that sort. Activity is centered more and more in giant metropolitan foci, and modern transportation and communication are primarily of a point-to-point nature connecting the metropoli.

The nature of the interconnected modern world is perhaps best characterized by jet air travel where the traveler boards a plane in one airport and is carried directly high into the sky above the clouds, where he no longer views the world unfolding in front of him as he has in all forms of conventional land transport; and, then, at his destination he drops down into another metropolitan center much like the one he left. Increasingly such experiences are not just those between metropolitan centers on a single continent but between centers throughout the world-wide intercontinental system.

## The Two Equations in Social Science Teaching

Our world today is made up of two very different equations for human life on the earth: (1) the traditional locally-based culture which depends primarily on the know-how of a particular small group out of the total population of the earth and on the resources of a tiny fragment of the full earth environment, and (2) the new world-wide interconnected system that draws on the resources of parts of the whole earth and, we might add, is building its own distinctive culture by incorporating bits and pieces from the many different culture areas that it touches, although its European origins appear to be still dominant.

We have identified our task in social science as giving individuals an understanding of the world in which they live and, within that charge, to find order in the chaos of the myriad human and earth relations in a seemingly infinite number of places. Our aim is to find an over-all framework within which to examine the variations of human life over the world.

Fundamental to our task in providing understanding of human life on the earth today is something more than just that different human groups have developed variations on a single human equation of living on the earth; in fact mankind today lives according to two systems that draw upon the earth environment in very different ways and result in fundamentally different perspectives of life and in very different problems and potentials.

The framework of social science should establish the two different human systems as the basic frame within which to compare and contrast life from place to place or component to component. Parts of the whole of mankind's life on the earth relate to one or the other or both of these two systems.

The two models we have outlined would seem to offer the basic ingredients of the over-all framework. All human life can be viewed as falling within one or the other of the two models. Thus, the frame of social science may be provided by the examination of the two models, their internal variations from place to place and culture to culture, and the juxtaposition of the two basic systems from one place to the other over the earth.

Surely the two systems impinge upon one another. As we have noted, no primarily locally-based community is completely isolated from contacts with the world-wide interconnected network. Someone from the interconnected system -- doctor, missionary, or scientist -- has entered the community. Eskimos drink tea and carry firearms; primitive Africans raise cotton to sell, or leave the village to work in mines. All of the centers of the world-wide network, not only have contacts today with some fundamentally locally-based communities, but, in fact, have developed out of locally-based communities of the past. Thus they carry vestiges of locally-based values in their culture -- political and social ideas, thoughts about what is "right" and "wrong", about God, about what to eat. The fact that we tend to teach social sciences emphasizing the "cultures of the world" approach, rather than of the two models of human life, is an indicateon of our locally-based tradition and of our view of a political state necessarily covering contiguous territory and expecting the primary loyalty of all peoples within that territory.

It might be thought that social scientists already recognize the two different systems and deal with them. We regularly talk of "developed" and "underdeveloped" areas, sometimes using other terms such as "industrial" and "nonindustrial" or "technologically advanced" and "technologically less-advanced." But such a division tends to follow the old mosaic tile approach, separating the world into really homogeneous pieces.

The point is that the two different systems are not found side-by-side in the traditional mosaic pattern. Instead, the interconnected network has spread over the mosaic touching down in particular points, but not in others. Thus, in any given part of the earth one can find the two different systems in close juxtaposition. In the Congo, most people may still live in the locally-based system focused on their own piece of earth real estate, but Leopoldville is a city with regular communication and traffic with the world-wide network as are the Katanga copper region and other producing areas. Mexico is both Mexico City, with its rather important position in the interconnected world, and the Indian village, which is only peripherally tied to the world beyond walking distance from the village. In the United States, at first glance, the whole country might be considered part of the interconnected network, but what about the Navajos or even the rural European stock in parts of Appalachia or the Ozarks?

It may appear that the two systems have been largely defined in economic terms. This is because the problem has been seen particularly in terms of two different approaches to how to live in this world, and living depends first of all upon a system of economic sustenance. But the two systems, as we know, in reality touch on all aspects of man's life. This is easy to see in the locally-based model. There the social group has been largely isolated; so it has had to work out all of the questions of life -- what is right, as well as what to eat; what is the meaning of life, as well as what to wear.

The world-wide interconnected system is also more than just an economic system. There is developing something of a common culture within the system. For example, in communities throughout the system interest in jazz, in mini-skirts, or in zen or yoga is evidence of this.

The point is that the examination of social science in terms of the overall frame of the two model systems and their juxtaposition gives us a base for understanding either the whole of mankind's life on this earth or of any part of it. It gives us a basis for not only comparison, but for comprehending pieces of the whole, whether those pieces involve either issues or areas. We can use the frame in developing the historical time-dimension as well as in examining the present scene. Within it we can study at any scale: that of the real world of the individual's everyday life, at one extreme, and of the abstract planetary world at the other.

The frame also enables us to examine the world at different levels of complexity. It would seem essential that any coneeptual frame for social science be applicable at all levels of the individual's educational development -- from nursery school to the Ph.D. Often the simplistic world we paint in the early grades is not just simple; it is an unreal myth that presents misconceptions that are most difficult to change. As a geographer, the example that comes to mind is the mental set caused by case studies of peoples living within different environmental zones of the earth -- the tropical forests, deserts, or mid-latitude coasts -- with the inference that differences in peoples are primarily the result of the different environmental circumstances they find themselves in. In the same way, early studies that concentrate on countries or cultures grossly misrepresent the situation.

The two-fold framework of human life is not simplistic. Analysis of either system is complex; and, as yet, we have little empirical data on the flow of information, of decision-making and control in the world-wide interconnected system. But we have been concerned with establishing real challenges within social sciences that will take hold of the best students, and the frame proposed here would seem to offer that challenge and at the same time provide a vehicle within which modern scientific techniques and tools can be applied to the social sciences.

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# SELECTING AND PROCESSING INFORMATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS EDUCATION

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An interesting cartoon appeared in the New Yorker magazine a while back. It showed a tired-looking gent sitting on the examining table in a doctor's office. The doctor, stethoscope around his neck, says to him, "You're suffering from sensory overload. Cut down on your intake of media."[1]

Educators especially can feel immediate empathy for the tired patient. From the moment we wake up, we are bombarded by "messages," as the communications people put it -- from radio, television, or a newspaper. All day long we receive them over the telephone, from printed matter, and from other people. And not only is there a greater volume from a growing number of means, but there are more and more messages to receive from an increasingly complex world.

The task of education then, becomes largely that of developing skills and insights in information selection and information processing. Increasingly our well-being as individuals and as a species depends on our effectiveness in discriminating among messages arising not only from around us but from distant sources and on our capacity to make decisions about how and when to respond to that incoming information.

World affairs education is mainly the activity of developing criteria for discriminating, evaluating, selecting, and responding to useful and relevant data in the communication flow of reports about conditions and developments in the international environment. It is the development in students' minds of a map of the world that includes a rich content and a realistic organization for the international environment that is the goal of world affairs instruction. The subject matter of the curriculum is an instrument in this development -- but it is no more than an instrument. The choice of subject matter to be taught in the school depends entirely on the pursuit of this more fundamental objective.

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[1] Caption for drawing by Koren in the New Yorker.

Most of our teaching from the first grade through the undergraduate college years has concentrated on the setting forth of descriptive details, the specifying of numerous definitions and classifications of data, and the presenting of common-sense maxims, principles, and generalities. We need to face the interpretation that when school graduates act as illiterates in history and geography after years of teaching in these fields, the reason has to be that the material was not relevant -- it did not fit somehow in the cognitive framework. Having failed to gain a foothold, it could not grow there. In no way does this interpretation suggest that historical and geographical subject matters are worthless, inapplicable, or inappropriate. To the contrary, the problem is just that of relevancy.

## How We Structure Data

We have some clues to how the selection process works in the minds of people. Theory and research on "the structure of meaning" have set forth some primitive terms of comparison used by human beings, apparently universally, in arriving at criteria of "importance." How stimuli are recognized, differentiated, and processed has been studied across a broad range of empirical situations. The basic finding is that people resort "naturally" to a categorization that orders data in three broad dimensions -- weak-strong, good-bad, and active-passive. The theory is that our "meaning space" is organized in combinations of these criteria of judgment. What we do, apparently, upon becoming aware of an unfamiliar fact, is to scan, organize, and interpret by asking, in effect; "how strong is it?" "how good is it?" and "how active is it?"

What is included under the headings of "good," "strong," and "active" will vary according to individual judgments, cultural directives, and situational influences; but the contention is that the three dimensions are fundamental and that everybody learns to understand according to the dimensions. A simple mental experiment which applies the three dimensions would seem to show their universality.

One can elicit successfully the "good," "strong," and "active" responses from a five year old child by asking about the identification of "mother," "teacher," "my best friend," or the "President of the United States." The ability of the young child to answer suggests a record of practice in the use of these categories. If one analyzes different aspects of a public debate about some disputed issue (for example, the U.S. participation in the Vietnam war), most of the views expressed fall readily into the three primitive categories or into combinations. The same elements can usually be recognized in even the most sophisticated analyses of public affairs in the relative weightings assigned and the combinations given of good and bad, strong and weak, and active and passive.

## Inquiry and Data Processing With a Computer

Having considered one way that students can be brought to understand how they respond to stimuli and structure meaning according to certain categories, let us consider a possible way that modern technology can aid students of the future in processing information as they inquire into social problems. Imagine a school in which each classroom is equipped with a computer console or an individual solid state computer with a library of data tapes and programs. Consider a standard procedure according to which questions and issues of a factual nature would be addressed first to the machine rather than to teacher and textbook. Then, most of the conventional rules and procedures which occupy the school day, as far as the social studies are concerned, could be greatly changed.

For example, let us imagine a dialogue that might take place between a student and teacher in a junior high school.

Student: "Do you think the Russians are better than the Chinese?"

Teacher: "In what way? What do you mean when you ask, are they better?"

Student: "Well, do the Russians make more good things for the people -- like cars, movies, refrigerators? Maybe Russians have more good things to eat?"

Teacher: "Make a list of what you think are 'good things.' Then you can ask the computer for information."

(The student compiles his list and the questions are fed to the computer.)

Computer: "The data requested are as follows. . ."

Student (Studying the printout): "See, the Russians are better."

Teacher: "Yes, but you still didn't check to see how much better. You didn't think to find out how many people there are in each country, how much income they receive, which people get what you call the 'good things,' and whether or not China is making faster progress than Russia in producing the products on your list. Are you sure that being able to make and use things like cars would make the Russians better than the Chinese? But first you should get the additional information from the machine. You should write your questions so you can find out how much income the average person receives in both countries. Also, try to find out what the lowest 25% and the highest 25% receive. Do you know how to do that? Remember to convert to dollar equivalents.

Student: "Yes."

Computer: "The distribution of passenger motor vehicles in the U.S.S.R. is . . . , etc."

Student: "I'll have the computer compare all this to the United States. Then I'm going to try to get information on two more things: are Russians happier than the Chinese and do Russians have more freedom than the Chinese? When I do that, I am going to get the facts about happiness and freedom for the United States -- and Sweden too -- just to make it more interesting."

Teacher: "You can't think of any way to show happiness, can you? You can think about that while you finish the comparison for the United States on products, population, income per capita and the like."

Student: "I already know some things to try for happiness. I'll use suicides, vacations people take, number of people in hospitals, murders, divorces, orphans, how long people live on the average, and maybe public opinion polls on what people say they worry about in all four countries. And, for freedom, I can check on elections, voters, churches, newspapers, how many people get to travel to other countries, and things like that."

Teacher: "That's good but you probably will have some problems. Just think about your indicators. You will have to convince me that they really stand for the things you say they stand for."

Computer: "The requested data are not available as follows . . ."

Student: "I can't get data for vacations, churches, and polls for the Peoples' Republic of China. There are some funny things too in the happiness index for Sweden and the U.S.S.R. I think Swedes are happier than the Russians, but the picture is mixed up. What do I do now?"

Teacher: "Which are you going to believe -- your personal impressions or your findings? You should know by now that interpreting your printouts is the hard part. There are validity problems with all sets of indicators; and in high school you will learn how to estimate the probable amount of error in your aggregated data and some ways to correct for it. Do the best you can with what you have now. What are you going to do about the missing data? You didn't get anything on Chinese vacations. How is that to be explained?"

Student: "Our computer just doesn't know that. Or maybe they don't have vacations. Or maybe their government doesn't let out the information? That would be good for the freedom index -- if I could find out what information is censored by the government. I guess the Chinese don't have vacations. I'll just drop vacations."

Teacher: "It is possible that there are some data estimates on religion in China. If you want to follow that, I'll approve a question to the central network."

Student: "I'll fill out the form."

. . . . . . . .

Later

Student: "I have everything completed now and it shows how Russia is better than China. But I don't think I can really decide. Anyway, the program turned out another way when I added the U.S. and Sweden."

Teacher: "Go ahead and write your summary. Keep to the facts that you actually used and don't add a lot of statements about matters that you did not investigate. Show your conclusions but indicate which ones you are sure about and which ones are less reliable, no matter how much you like them. Your choice of the original question was a poor one, but I let you go ahead to see if you could correct it; and you did quite well. Next time you program, see if you can't make a series of more precise and interesting comparisons. Maybe you could follow up on David Smith's investigation of laws in five countries which restrict individual freedom. Since you started on freedom, you might want to look into it more fully. You could analyze freedom of speech and press for, perhaps, ten countries in the Atlantic area and see what generalizations about legal restrictions can be made for the period 1900 to the present. I think the computer has all the information you need."

It seems to me the foregoing is illustrative of a type of inquiry that creates relational, relevant knowledge. To some extent, educational technology, and especially the computer, can serve as both lecturer and library. The role of the teacher in providing information can be largely shifted to the machine. The classroom can become more of a laboratory in the social sciences, with teacher and student working together as researchers.

Probably for lack of any available alternative, we have long sacrificed inquiry in the social studies to the "coverage" of data. The problem is a difficult one. We need to find means to encompass even much larger amounts of data to increase its relevancy. At the same time, we need a strong emphasis on inquiry. We also need a general framework and a reliable guide to the identification of significant lines of inquiry in the social studies. Finally, some real stress needs to be placed on the international dimension.

This article has sought to show, at least impressionistically, how we might begin to break free from the data coverage yoke and to begin to design a curriculum by other standards and criteria. We have suggested one way of organizing information that may help in making better instructional choices in the curriculum on world affairs in the schools.

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# "The World of the Forthcoming Decades: A Pessimistic and Optimistic View"

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In building conjectures about the world and the unfolding of international relations in the forthcoming decades we are confronted with three broad considerations--environmental resources; numbers and densities of population; and levels of technology. In a sense, the future can be viewed as a close race between population growth, on the one hand, and the increasing capacity of people, on the other hand, to harness the environment effectively and to achieve sufficient wisdom soon enough to manage conflicts peaceably and use technology constructively.

Given man's record to date, the potentials for world conflict are staggering. But human beings have the capacity to pursue rational solutions if they choose to do so. However, tasks of the magnitude of those which confront us require considerable lead time for effective solutions. Even if the population brakes were slammed on world-wide tomorrow--an unlikely, virtually impossible occurrence--it would require many years for the full consequences to be realized.

The task is at once political, economic and technological. It is also social and psychological. But technology in a broad sense--the organization and application of human knowledge, skills and tools--provide us with unprecedented alternatives and opportunities, provided we can learn fast enough to make timely and adequate use of them. Unfortunately--but inevitably--these unfolding technological developments can be used to save mankind and enhance his creativity and possibilities for self-fulfillment; or to increase his misery and even to bring about his self-destruction.

Among ongoing technological revolutions with a capacity for profoundly altering the lives and fortunes of all mankind are: (1) nuclear power and weaponry; (2) space exploration; (3) satellite networks with capacity for providing "instant" verbal and visual communications over much of the earth; (4) supersonic transportation bringing all major cities of the world within less than an hour's commuting distance of each other; (5) cybernetic systems with possibilities of controlling industries, communication and transportation, urban services, tax allocation and collection, voting arrangements, police records and the like and of contributing to and vastly enhancing engineering, architectural planning, urban development, diagnosis of disease, bio-engineering, space and ocean exploration and development and so forth; (6) the prolongation of life, the enchancement of specialized functions by surgical implantation and electronic supplementation, manipulation of genetic structure and the creation of life itself.

Virtually every one of these developments can be viewed as having positive consequences or negative consequences or--more probably- a combination of both. A mapping of extreme possibilities might look something like this:

| Optimistic | Pessimistic |
|---|---|
| World-wide, consensual, pluralistic but effective international control and institutions for resolving international disputes--possibly with decentralized regional units for regional conflicts. Universally sanctioned countervailing measures for heading off disorders and potentially dangerous confrontations- some economic, perhaps other social or political or judicial. National armed forces as out of date as private armed forces are today-- | Cataclysmic nuclear, biological or radiological war. Or proliferation of more conventional and less devastating but nevertheless destructive and disruptive wars on land, on sea, in the air, and in space. Or, generations of cold war; nuclear or other blackmail from military bases in space; ideological warfare through control of communication satellites. Proliferation of conflicts along a single or a |

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| armies, navies and air forces (if they exist at all) having become a carefully controlled and safeguarded monopoly of the international peace-keeping institutions for the preservation of international law, order and justice. Military technology converted for ocean and space exploration and colonization and other constructive enterprises on a vast international scale. | few lines of cleavage; e.g., the richer, securer, advancing, healthier, longer living, and less prolific whites versus the poorer, less secure, slower developing, less healthy, shorter-living, more prolific coloreds. |
| Population levels carefully regulated by region in accord with available resources and levels of productivity. Loosening of national barriers to allow free flows of travel and immigration is correlated with inducements to attract populations where a labor force is needed or where the environment can support larger numbers of people. World-wide opportunities for advancement on basis of inherent capability and without restriction with respect to race, creed, color, and perhaps nationality. Rational, world-wide, intercontinental, inter-cultural and international programs for agricultural, economic, technological and scientific development. Industries seek their functional environments, but non-industrial regions | Vast uncontrolled population increases, coupled with continuing pollution and exhaustion of resources--at least in some parts of the world. Travel and immigration strictly limited from economic necessity and fear. Rich nations getting richer, poor nations getting poorer; within nations the well-to-do majority gaining while the depressed minorities become more depressed. Wars of "liberation" in underdeveloped areas and endemic guerilla conflicts threatening to escalate. |

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| enjoy equal access to industrial products--and without undue additional cost. | |
| Internationally regulated visual and audial communications networks serving as a world-wide free and open market place for news, information, knowledge and culture. Strict safeguards against possibilities for monolithic control by a single nation or a few. | Cybernetic control of visual and audial communications networks around the world by a single autocratic power or two or three deeply antagonistic superpowers. |
| Division and dispersion of governmental decision and control--according to function--on local, provincial, national, regional and world-wide levels. World-wide, international functions limited to the keeping of world-wide peace; international economic, technological, scientific and communications regulation and development; international space exploration and control. National autonomy with respect to national affairs which do not impinge on the welfare and security of other nations. Considerable provincial and local autonomy wherever such autonomy is functional or calculated as desirable to couterbalance the power and authority of the national government. Computers programmed to perform routine administra- | Supergovernments (or super-industries, religious, benevolent and protective associations, or crime syndicates) controlling--with cybernetic aids--tax levying and collection, police surveillance, education and indoctrination, political and/or religious belief without countervailing pressures and protections available to individuals and small groups; dictatorships with almost instantly retrievable master files and dossiers for each of its citizens with vital statistics, intelligence and aptitude quotients, personality profiles, school credentials, employment records, tax status, law violations, record of memberships, associations, incautious |

tive functions and reduce top-heavy bureaucracies. Vastly increased citizen participation in local and even national governments.

As cybernetics and automation take over more and more of the repetitive tasks of society, the educational system enhances the capacities of citizens to participate in the arts (painting, sculpture, music, literature, theater, dance, motion-picture making), science (experiment, discovery), self-government and other creative undertakings. Population planning keeps the numbers of people in balance with technology and resources. Rational efforts are made to keep age distributions in dynamic ratio--although the concept of "planned death" raises admittedly difficult problems. Machines take over labor functions almost entirely and leave people free to develop creative talents. Men are the masters; machines the responsive slaves. The boundary between "serious work" (more or less "productive" labor) and the serious hobby disappears. People do what they like to do--sail the

remarks, indiscretions, etc. Also, governments or professional groups with the knowledge and power to lengthen or shorten life, tamper surgically or genetically with human minds and bodies.

Societies in which automation performs most of the functions and large numbers of human beings are left with time which they do not know how to spend. Proliferation of neuroses and alienations. Vast cities with enormous slums; people poorly fed, housed, educated and in ill-health. The old and young over-balanced in proportion to those of working age. Urban social, economic and political functions lag behind population growth and technology. Welfare programs inadequate; transportation hopelessly snarled.

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| seven seas in small boats, climb mountains, keep bees--without stigma of laziness or irresponsibility. People gain in freedom and individuality. | |
| Urban areas carefully and functionally planned to allow open spaces--mountains, lakes, beaches, parks, etc. Cities and open spaces blend. All wastes--water, air, food remnants, scrap metal--collected and reprocessed. Social services and public facilities (hospitals, universities, museums, art galleries, etc.) localized for access and community integration. Some cities, in themselves, become works of art. | Disappearance of forests and wild-life, except in a few, inadequate reserves; vast stretches of tarmac, concrete paving and rows of prefabricated dwelling boxes. Continuing pollution of rivers, lakes, harbors, bays, coastal waters and air. Social services and public facilities scattered and inadequate for immense population. |
| Cybernetics, learning theory, teaching machines and general systems conceptual frameworks speed the learning process enormously to develop citizens who can adapt to the exponential growth of technology and participate in adjusting their social, economic and political institutions to a rapidly changing environment. The new learning fosters a renaissance in the arts. From this learning and as an outcrop of wisdom accumulated from | Scientific and technological developments proceed so rapidly that only a narrow intellectual elite can keep up with exploding knowledge and specialized skills. Political, social and economic institutions increasingly fail in making adjustments to the changing environment, and individual human beings find it increasingly difficult to adapt psychologically and behaviorally to the changes that are taking place so rapidly. Either those relative few who master the new learning and |

practical experience, an enlightened citizenry of the world will discover how to make constructive use of bioengineering, the prolongation of human life, and the capacity for creating life. The world becomes a pleaseant place in which to live--material needs are adequately met, and the traditional terrors of early and violent death are virtually eliminated. People are free to pursue lives of deep satisfaction.

technology control those who do not have access to knowledge and skills (or those who lack the ability to learn in a highly competitive environment); or, those who understand the uses of power win over or manipulate the skilled and knowledgeable elite and thereby rule the rank and file of the populace. For all but a favored few the world becomes an increasingly regimented and unpleasant place--and with time even the rulers may find themselves disagreeably constricted by growing populations and seemingly shrinking space.

# EDUCATION FOR THE SPACESHIP EARTH

by

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The "noosphere," as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin calls it, is far and away the most important aspect of the world social system.[1] This is the sphere of cognitive structures or images as they exist in the minds of men or even in non-human structures. A central purpose of the "knowledge industry" as Fritz Machlup calls it[2] is to transmit the noosphere from one generation to the next as well as to expand it and make it correspond more and more with "reality," whatever that is. It is a slightly terrifying thought that all human knowledge is lost approximately every generation by the processes of aging and death and it has to be replaced in new bodies. If this process of transmission were interrupted even for thirty years, the human race would revert probably to its paleolithic condition or might even become extinct.

Formal education, that is, the process which goes on in schools, colleges, universities and other "firms" of the knowledge industry, is only part of this great process of transmission. As the human being grows from birth to adulthood he learns a great deal from the simple observation of the world around him through his senses. He learns a great deal also from his peers and in his family, mostly from oral communication; and in these days he learns a great deal from the television and the radio. Once he has been taught to read, mainly by the agencies of formal education, he can learn a great deal by reading outside the processes of schooling. Nevertheless, the noosphere of the modern world is so large and so complex that it requires a large formal educational establishment to transmit it. This establishment furthermore grows larger all the time and absorbs an ever

[1] Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York, Harper and Row, 1961).

[2] Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962).

increasing proportion of the gross national product partly because as knowledge grows continuously, more effort is required just to transmit it from one generation to the next; partly because education is a technologically unprogressive industry and so the price of education continually rises relative to other commodities.

The noösphere consists not merely of images of the world of objects; it also contains images of values, both those of personal preference which we call tastes and those preferences which we feel apply beyond ourselves to other people and which we call ethical systems. Ethical systems, that is, shared values and preferences, are an essential part of community. A culture or a subculture can be defined as a group of people holding certain value systems in common, and a community is simply the organizational expression of a culture. A vital part of the transmission process, therefore, is "socialization"; that is, the feeding of inputs into the growing child, largely of information and symbolism, which will turn him into a member of "his" community. It is this process which turns Chinese children into Chinese and American children into Americans. In this process formal education plays a role at least as important as that of the family and the peer group. Thus as the church transmits a religious culture from its present adult members to their children, so the public school system of all countries is a kind of "church" of the national state, socializing the child into becoming a citizen of a particular country in which he grows up.

Herein lies one of the great dilemmas of the world today and especially the dilemma of international education. Because of what has happened in the field of technology, especially of transportation and weaponry, in the past few decades, the world has become a "spaceship," a small rather crowded globe hurtling through space to an unknown destination and bearing on its surface a very fragile freight of mankind and the noösphere which inhabits men's minds.

This represents a very fundamental change in the condition of man, a change which furthermore only a few people have really appreciated. Up till very recently the human race was expanding on what was for all practical purposes an illimitable plane. It may have been "a darkling plain where ignorant armies clash by night," as Matthew Arnold called it, but it was for all practical purposes an illimitable, if rough, plane. As long as there was always somewhere to go over the horizon, neither ignorance nor armies nor clashes could be fatal. If one civilization collapsed another one could always rise a few hundred miles away. All history, in other words, until very recently, has been local and has not involved the concept of the "sociosphere" or the total sphere of all human activity extending all round the earth. It is now almost a cliche to say that the world has become one and it has become small. The real implications of this, however, are very far from having been realized. The kind of organization, ethic, and conduct which may be quite appropriate to a great plane are quite inappropriate for the crowded and precarious conditions of a spaceship. The great problem of this generation is precisely to provide a symbol, an ethical code, and an organizational structure which is appropriate to this extraordinary transformation in the real condition of mankind.

Here the system of formal education finds itself caught in a very painful dilemma. On the one hand, it is formal education, especially at the level of the university, which has mainly created the spaceship and destroyed the great plane. Science, it is true, originated and developed largely outside of the structure of the formal university. Nevertheless, today it is the university which is the principal agent of transmission and expansion of the body of scientific knowledge, and it is this body of knowledge which has created the jet plane and the nuclear weapon.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find an increasing tension between the university as a community and the rest of society which supports it, simply because the university is the representative of what I have elsewhere called the "superculture" and is primarily engaged both in expanding the superculture and transmitting it to the next generation. In many respects, however, this superculture is in sharp conflict with the ideals and the images of the folk culture or the local culture around it which still retains the attitudes and the images which are appropriate to the great plane. The world-wide student unrest is perhaps only one symptom of a larger conflict between the whole university community and the local societies in which it is everywhere embedded, whether these are Communist or capitalist, traditional or modern, for even the most modern of societies contains very large elements of the folk and local culture out of which the superculture has grown.

On the whole this conflict between the superculture and the local cultures has not yet penetrated very far down into the high school and the grade school from the universities. Nevertheless, insofar as the universities produce the teachers in the primary and secondary schools or at least produce the teachers of these teachers, the tensions between the whole educational industry and the society around it may be expected to grow, at least for one more generation.

International education is all too likely to be the focal point of this conflict. On the Great Plane we can play cowboys and Indians; and it is even appropriate to develop local societies, or nations, which build their identity largely around contrast with and opposition to the neighboring nations around them. The appropriate value system and image of the world under these circumstances is highly ethnocentric, looking at the world in sharp perspective from the capital city of the nation and developing a value system in which the nation is highly sacred, demands and receives sacrifices of human life, as well as liberty and treasure, and finds its highest expression of community in war. It is not surprising, therefore, that in primary and secondary schools everywhere national anthems are sung, pledges to flags are repeated, and the portrait of the reigning ruler or president is frequently displayed prominently. Furthermore, the curriculum is designed to glorify the national state, geography is taught in a perspective manner with the home country prominently studied and displayed, the national boundaries are firmly printed into the consciousness, and foreign countries are treated as distant and reduced in size. In history and social studies, likewise, the history of the home country is glorified and the histories of other countries are neglected. National school systems indeed are not above a good deal of falsification of history in the interest of creating good citizens. In the study of literature, similarly, the native language, except in colonial countries and regions, receives prime attention and other languages and literatures are regarded as "foreign." Only science in the curriculum can be regarded as a universal element. Even here the achievements of native scientists may be prominently displayed and the foreign scientists underplayed.

Any attempt to introduce what might be called a spaceship-earth education, therefore, will be regarded with extreme suspicion. Wherever the curriculum of formal education impinges on images of the world which the local culture around it treasures, sensitive areas are set up which are avoided as far as possible. Religion, race, and nationalism, as has already been noted, are among these areas; and the study of the international system almost inevitably impinges on all of them. It is not surprising, therefore, that international education tends to follow the innocuous patterns of interesting stories about strange children, and any attempt to teach the international system as a total system might easily run into very serious criticism for the defenders of the local culture. This is precisely because what might be called international systems education, to distinguish it from the more innocuous brands, deliberately sets out to destroy the illusions of perspective and to point out that things at a distance are not really small, still less are they unimportant. We can still, however, concede a great deal of realism in the proposition that the near are dear. Moral perspectives of this kind are not only realistic but are not incompatible with the systems point of view.

Those engaged in formal education, therefore, are always walking an uneasy tightrope. On the one hand, it is easy for them to violate the sensibilities of the older generation, especially those in the folk culture, who after all largely pay their salaries. On the other hand, the educator who does not "tell it like it is" is in great danger of being found out if the image of the world which he is propagating to his students does not correspond to what they are going to discover in their subsequent life experience. If a student finds that teachers have deceived him and have taught him things that are not so, the whole sacredness, prestige and legitimacy of the teaching profession is threatened. My own case as an example. My formal education was heavily weighted with messages designed to turn me into a good little Englishman. In adolescence I read H. G. Well's Outline of History, which persuaded me that my teachers, especially my history teachers, were liars; and largely I think as a result of this, I eventually became an American. If our children find out that their teachers are liars, or at least superstitious and gravely in error, the consequences to the whole socialization process and the very fabric of society itself could be disastrous. Some of the current revolt of youth, especially of students, may very well be related to the fact that the pablum which they get in primary and secondary schools is so unrelated to the realities of the world today that it proves indigestible.

The critical question of international education, therefore, is whether we can develop an image of the world system which is at the same time realistic and also not too threatening to the folk cultures within which the school systems are embedded; for if educators do not find a palatable formula, the "folk" will revolt and seek to divert formal education once again into traditional channels, as for instance in the famous anti-evolution laws of Tennessee and Arkansas or even some so-called "economic education." A possible approach to this problem is to take advantage of the new image of the world that is a consequence of the exploration of space in which, for instance, the act of viewing the earth from the moon clearly reveals it as a ball floating in space and makes very clear the closed nature of the sphere. From the vantage point of the moon, the facts are so clear that it should not be too difficult to organize a whole curriculum around the concept of the earth as a total system, including of course a certain amount of astronomy to put earth in its setting in the solar system, the galaxy and the universe. The inputs to the earth from anything outside it except the sun are so minute - in terms of energy, though not in terms of information - that from the point of view of earth as a system we can virtually neglect them.

We could continue, then, with geomorphology and the study of the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere as total systems, always constantly moving towards an equilibrium which is equally constantly disturbed. Then, of course, we go on to the biosphere, which should be taught mainly from the point of view of world ecology stressing the interdependence with the other systems but stressing also the concept of the ecosystem on both the micro and the macro scale. The time dimension would constantly be introduced to give an evolutionary perspective both in the study of inorganic and organic forms so that the student is introduced to the concept of development in biological evolution. From this it should be an easy transition to the sociosphere and to human history and to geography, beginning with the geography of the paleolithic and pre-human hominids, going on to the neolithic and then to shifting and expanding patterns of civilization. The problem of time perspective is particularly difficult here. The near is interesting as well as the dear, and what is near in time and space is of more interest to us than what is distant. Nevertheless, there must be some kind of uneasy compromise between the anti-perspective view which regards the present moment and the present location of the student as a very small sample of an enormous totality stretching through time and space and the perspective view which frankly asks the student to look back into time, forward into the future, and out into space from where he is at the moment. It was one of the real strengths of progressive education that it could capture the interest of the student by starting from where he was. On the other hand, if the education process leaves the student there, it will have failed in its essential function, which is precisely to destroy the illusion of perspective and to enable the student to step outside of himself and see himself as a point - or rather something like a four-dimensional worm - in the enormous space-time continuum of the universe. Hardly any problem relating to education is trickier than this.

When we come down to the study of the international system proper as a segment of the total sociosphere, the dilemma of perspective becomes even more agonizing. From the anti-perspective point of view the international system is seen as a total globular system of over one hundred national states, a variety of dependencies, a cluster of international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, plus the international corporations and so on. A great deal of what is ordinarily taught in the history books is the history of the international system or at least of a segment of it. It has been only within the last four hundred years that the system has become truly global in its extent. It is only in the last generation it has become a real "spaceship system" in which war is becoming increasingly intolerable and dangerous, and in which the international system itself because of its inherent stability is tending to gobble up an increasing proportion of world resources and income - resources which in the present critical stage of human development can very ill be spared.

One of the great problems of international education, whether at the adult or at the school level is the absence of any clear image of the dynamics of the international system and particularly of any dynamic process which would lead towards an alternative system which is superior to what we have now. It is very hard to teach what we do not know, and the awful truth is that we do not know very much about the international system. The theory about it is very inadequate, the information system from which we derive our images of it has a built-in tendency to produce misinformation, and on the whole the decision-makers in the international system are dominated by what might be called "folk images" approximately at the level of the flat earth.

A very important element in the subconscious attitude towards the teaching of the international system is a widespread fear that the international system must move towards world government and the destruction of existing national sovereignties. There is indeed a fair amount of propaganda to this effect by the World Federalists and like-minded people. This is similar to the often largely subconscious fear that any discussion of religion will lead to the loss of faith or any discussion of economics will lead to socialism or any discussion of race will lead to racial mixtures. All these fears are deeply ingrained in the folk cultures of this country and, in some form, of all countries, and furthermore they cannot simply be dismissed as irrational, although they all have strong irrational elements in them.

It is very important therefore for the teachers and researchers in the international system to have an image of the future which does not necessarily involve either total catastrophe, or a reversal of the developmental process, or the destruction of existing national states and their total absorption into a universal world culture and polity. Just as we are beginning to see domestically that the more complex a society, the more pluralistic it can afford to be, so we ought to be able to see in the international system that a system is possible which both preserves the national state and is capable of stable peace. The critical question is what are the dynamic processes by which this happy state is achieved.

Up to now the body of what might be called received knowledge in the international system has not really faced up to these problems, though the work of writers like John Burton[3] in England and myself in this country suggests that solutions to the problem of war are possible short of world government and not inconsistent with the preservation of local and national cultures and organizations. If this view could become widespread, even as a kind of orthodox synthesis between the views of the status quo "realists" who think the present international system can survive, which I think is

[3] John W. Burton is the author of International Relations (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1966).

an illusion, and the world government advocates whose solution is much too radical and frightening to receive much acceptance, we might finally have something to teach which would be acceptable, both to the scholars and to the lay public. Here again we must stress the tremendous interconnection between teaching and research because again we cannot teach what we do not know.

It is shocking that there is no word for the science of international systems. One would like to suggest Xenoology (from the Greek xenos - foreign) on the ground that the international system arises precisely because some people regard other people as "foreign." This would be indeed the science of generalized foreign affairs. Perhaps there is not enough yet to teach. Nevertheless, I am not so optimistic enough to think that in the last generation at least we have developed both a body of theory and the beginnings at least of a systematic collection of information which make such a science conceivable.

This raises the question, however, when we have something to teach, who will teach the teachers? This perhaps is a one-generation lag which we can very ill afford. The "new economics" of the 1930's is only now beginning to penetrate the secondary schools. The new international politics of Xenoology would have an even thornier path to tread before it got anything like general acceptance. It may well be, therefore, that we do need to think in terms of the whole program and of how the student and the teacher may be prepared to accept a total curriculum based on the spaceship earth.

Here the preparation of learning materials may be as important as the preparation of teachers themselves. Every child should certainly have a globe, and there must be ways of making him brood over it with the ambition of reaching some sort of geographical closure; that is, knowing roughly at least where everything is. One would like indeed to see the principle of the spelling bee applied to simple geography so that it becomes as it were a kind of sport to know who everybody' neighbors are. The desire for closure, for knowing everything about something, that produces for instance the spelling bee and the passion that many twelve-year olds have for knowing the averages of all baseball players throughout history is something that we have inadequately exploited in our educational motivations. Geography of course could be a beautiful case of it, simply because the map of the world is now virtually complete. History is more difficult because of the added dimension. Nevertheless, a fairly substantial investment in good historical atlases would go a long way towards correcting the fallacies of perspective especially if these too were printed on globes. What I would like, indeed, would be a globe for every year of human history printed so that it could be explored with a microscope and so that the student, for instance, who wanted to know the history of, shall we say, Northern Italy in 1313 would simply go to the corresponding globe and examine Northern Italy with a microscope and find the history printed there. One could do a great deal also with movies that zoom from outer space to show the setting of any particular event. Devices like these might encourage a learning process both in teachers and students which would be very far reaching. In a way the computer may have done us a disservice by diverting our attention from these simpler and more static devices because of the intoxication with the manipulation of numerical data. This too has its place, however; and the development of games and simulation should not be neglected.

It could well be that the next fulcrum from which the earth might be moved will be the teachers colleges and the universities which have grown out of them but which still specialize in the training of teachers. A program in the international system for the teachers of teachers would have a multiplier effect and could bring about quite rapid change.

Finally, of course, there is the good old book, still the backbone of education of all kinds, in spite of audiovisual and computational aids. Here the need is for a pioneering book which will attempt to convey, especially to the high school student, the sense of excitement, the sense of wide new horizons and the sense of worl reconstruction which is going on now among the students of the international system. Whether a book like this can be commissioned I do not know. It might be worth a try or we may just have to wait for it. The need for a book of this kind is so great, however, that one can hardly believe that the supply will not be forthcoming.

We cannot predict exactly what form the book - or books - is going to take. We can, however, visualize several characteristics. It will involve essentially an image of the international system which includes a developmental dynamic just as the image of the economic system now includes a notion of economic development. The great advantage economists have is that in measures like real income per head we have a single scalar measure which at least gives us a good clue as to whether we are going up or down. In the international system it is often very difficult to tell whether we are going up or down. A measure of the "tone" of the international system as a whole, derived perhaps from the content analysis of public utterances, would carry us a long way towards the image of a developmental dynamic. A developmental dynamic in the international system, however, implies that we know at least vaguely where we want to go. Here, as I have suggested earlier, a dynamic which moves in the direction of stable peace among relatively independent nations seems to be much preferable in the present state of affairs than a dynamic which moves toward a world state, even less a world empire. The fact that we have already established stable peace in segments of the international system, (for instance, in North America and in Scandinavia) suggests that a dynamic process which leads towards stable peace among independent nations already exists. At the moment, however, we are not self-conscious about this and we do not direct our teaching of the international system in this direction. In North America, for instance, I have been arguing that we got stable peace as a result of a succession of lucky accidents; for instance, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, the settlement of the Oregon boundary at the 49th parallel (we didn't get 54°-40° and we didn't fight), the British non-intervention in the Civil War, and so on. History is not taught, however, emphasizing these turning points or, as I have sometimes called them, hurdles.

I have attempted to develop a theory of the dynamics of stable peace along the lines that it is something like a hurdles race: if the doves win three times we are "in"; but if they lose any one time, we have to go back to the beginning and start over again with a threat-counterthreat system. Up to now, therefore, stable pea has developed largely as a result of lucky accidents. If, however, we can get a self-conscious notion of the process and direct our teaching accordingly, we could produce national policies aimed at increasing the probabilities of stable peace. At the moment we do not really have such policies. We still regard peace and war as "political meteorology," just as we used to regard depressions as "economic meteorology." I remember, indeed, when the Great Depression was called an "economic blizzard." At the moment our teaching of history is completely the other way - it is designed to reinforce the image of unstable peace. Thus, as I travel around the country speaking, I frequently ask audiences if those who have heard of the Rush-Bagot agreement would raise their hands; the score is rarely more than about two per cent. Yet it could be argued that this is one of the most important events in American history and that without it the First World War would have been fought between Britain and the United States and could easily have taken place in the Middle West. Perhaps what is needed is a commission of historians, political scientists, strategists, peace researchers, and so on to study the problem of the dynamics of stable peace as it has developed especially in the last one hundred and fifty years with a view perhaps on developing a small textbook in this area. Or perhaps, as committees have such a poor record in literature, at least since the King James version of the Bible, we must hopefully wait for private enterprise to match the demand with a supply.

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# EDUCATION FOR THE CONCEPT OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY

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The nature and functions of the nation-state have been undergoing important changes in recent years. To conceptualize the "international system" entirely in terms of autonomous, supreme nation-states does not fully conform to current reality, nor does it provide an adequate model for realistic thinking about meeting world needs.

There is no doubt that the nation-state remains the dominant unit in the international system. After all, this is the basic assumption on which the international system is organized, an assumption that is constantly reinforced both by national and international institutions. This does not mean, however, that the typical nation-state is as independent or self-sufficient as the ideal model of the nation-state would imply. There is increasing penetration of national states by other states and by international organizations.[1] Even powerful states are constrained not only in their international activities (for example, the U.S. in the *Pueblo* incident), but also in their domestic affairs by events and reactions in other countries. Also, regional groupings are playing a larger role in the affairs of their component states. And, intergovernmental agencies, staffed by international civil servants, carry out various important non-political functions in such areas as health and welfare or economic development, at least for the smaller states.

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1. J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966).

In many important ways, therefore, both national governments and their individual citizens function in a transnational society, or a series of transnational societies. This reality is also reflected in the trends toward the development of a genuine world community. Among the youth of all nations, in particular, a common universal culture, with a common set of values and tastes, seems to be taking shape. Furthermore, both because of the existence of common problems and because of the increased facilities for cross-national communication, such events as student rebellions spread rapidly over a number of societies. International contact for many segments of national societies is extensive, especially in such professional fields as science, medicine, the arts, and various areas of scholarship. Thus, one may say that national lines have increasingly less meaning.

It is also becoming increasingly evident that the nation-state is no longer capable of serving some of the functions that it was designed to serve. Foremost among these is the function of military security, which no state -- no matter how powerful -- can fulfill on a unilateral basis today. Newer and poorer states, in particular, cannot entirely rely on their own resources to carry out the functions of economic development and of meeting the health and welfare needs of their populations. Higher education, scientific research, and technological development are among those functions that will increasingly have to be organized on a transnational basis. On all of these issues there are, of course, differences of opinion about the desirability of transnational as against national arrangements. The idea of arranging for military security on a transnational basis, for example,[2] is obviously controversial. In principle however, it should be possible to examine these questions on an empirical basis by setting criteria for what would be an adequate way of fulfilling a particular function and then comparing national and transnational arrangements in terms of the degree to which they meet these criteria.

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[2] See H. C. Kelman, "Internationalizing Military Force," in Q. Wright, W. M. Evan and M. Deutsch, eds., Preventing World War III: Some Proposals (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 106-122

The new realities and necessities of the international system inevitably involve some infringement of national sovereignty; however, they do not represent or require an abandonment of the nation-state. The nation-state can remain not only an important, but even the dominant political unit, while relegating certain functions and delegating certain powers to transnational or supranational entities. However, the new developments do mean that, at least in some areas, the nation-state has relinquished and must relinquish its paramountcy. By the same token, at the social-psychological level, the new developments do not require a displacement of national loyalties by loyalty to transnational institutions or organizations. They do, however, imply a tolerance for multiple loyalties, for permitting the development of transnational loyalties alongside of national ones. But there is no necessary conflict between the two; for multiple sets of loyalties are, *in principle*, completely compatible with one another, as long as the groups to which these loyalties are directed serve different functions and apply to different domains of a person's behavior.[3]

Role of schools

In the light of changing realities, it is the role of the schools to prepare students to understand the nature of the global society that is developing and to function within it. I do not mean that schools should deliberately foster internationalist values, but they should enable students to obtain a realistic picture of the extent to which we are in fact living in a global society and of the consequences of organizing various functions in a transnational as compared to a national way. I assume that this would make internationalist values a more viable option for the new generation of citizens. This should not and certainly need not be a matter of imposing internationalist values on them (although, of course, nationalist values are now being imposed on them in most schools), but a matter of giving them the tools for making intelligent choices between different alternatives under different circumstances.

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[3] See H. Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1955).

From all indications, schools do not now prepare their students adequately for such choices. I would assume that this is due, in large part, to the very same factors that create barriers to the development of a global society in the nation-state at large -- both among decision-makers and members of the general public. No doubt, a circular process is operating here. The failure to educate children for a global society strengthens the barriers against the development of such a society; the barriers against the development of a global society, in turn, help to account for the failure of the educational system to provide adequate preparation. The school curriculum can,thus, be a major force in breaking into this vicious circle.

The major source of barriers to a global society, in my view, is the cognitive and affective dominance of the national system in the minds of national populations. Our thinking is so thoroughly structured in terms of the national system that it is very difficult for us to think about -- and particularly to think creatively about -- other ways of organizing the world. Moreover, the nature of citizens' involvement in the national system is such that it generally also creates emotional barriers to transnational arrangements. There is a tendency to view transnational loyalties as incompatible with national loyalties and, therefore, to shy away from them. Thus, an education that promotes an understanding of our emerging global society and an openness to its possibilities requires an objective examination of national society and of the effects it has on our structuring of the world and on our emotional attachments. In the remainder of this paper I shall discuss some of the social-psychological considerations that might enter into such an examination.

Specifically, I shall (1) outline a model of the individual's sources of attachment to the modern nation-state, (2) show how the nature of the nation-state and of these attachments to it create cognitive and affective barriers to the development of a global society, and (3) describe some of the factors that favor the development of a global society or that can help in overcoming some of the barriers to it.

## Sources of individual attachment to the national system

A central component of the ideology of the modern nation-state is the principle that the nation-state is the political unit in which paramount authority is vested. The effective functioning of the nation-state, as it is commonly conceived, depends on a widespread acceptance of this ideology, or at least of its behavioral implications, within the population. A citizen who accepts the ideology regards the authority of the state and hence its specific demands on him as legitimate. In times of national crisis, these demands may call for unusual sacrifices from individual citizens. The state's ability to enlist this kind of sacrificial support -- without having to rely on coercion -- depends, in the final analysis,on its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

There are two ultimate sources of legitimacy for the national system: (1) the extent to which the national system reflects the ethnic-cultural identity of the national population, and thus generates sentimental attachment to the system, and (2) the extent to which the national system meets the needs and interests of the population, and thus generates instrumental attachment. In the long run, a political system cannot maintain its legitimacy unless at least a significant proportion of the population perceive it as meeting their needs and interests (although it can, of course, retain power by relying on coercive means, even if only a small elite are adequately integrated into the system). Up to a point, a system can maintain its legitimacy, even if it is not adequately meeting public needs, as long as it is seen by wide segments of the population as representing the nation. I use the term "nation" here in the cultural sense of a people sharing a common history, common values, and common traditions, rather than in the political sense of the population of a nation-state.

The correspondence between state and nation -- the assumption that the political entity corresponds to an ethnic, cultural, and historical entity with which at least large portions of the population identify -- is the major ideological underpinning of the modern nation-state and provides the theoretical justification for it. In fact, of course, there is hardly any nation-state in which such a precise correspondence holds in practice. That is, the nation-state usually covers more than one ethnic-cultural entity. Nonetheless, it can maintain its legitimacy even for minority ethnic groups if these have become assimilated into the majority culture in some essential respects (as in the United States) or if sub-populations have developed a common national identity in addition to their separate ethnic identities (as in Switzerland) or if it at least offers protection to the cultural identities of minority groups.

The two bases of legitimacy can, within limits, substitute for one another. That is, if the population's sentimental attachments to the system are strong, it can maintain its legitimacy even though it does not adequately meet their needs and interests, or does so only for a small proportion of the population. Conversely, if the population's instrumental attachments are strong, then it can maintain its legitimacy even though it does not adequately reflect its ethnic-cultural identity or does so only for a small proportion of the population. Furthermore, each of the two sources of legitimacy can potentially facilitate the development of the other. Thus, if a population perceives the system as being genuinely representative, then it is inclined to feel confident that the system will meet its needs most faithfully and provide the best protection of its interests. Supported by this initial confidence of the citizens and by their willingness to give it the benefit of the doubt, the regime is in a stronger position to push for economic development and to organize the society in a way that will in fact meet the needs and interests of the population. Similarly, a well-functioning society, which provides meaningful roles for its citizens, will develop a set of common values and traditions and a sense of unity that are tantamount to a national identity, even if the population was originally diverse in its ethnic and cultural identifications, such as Switzerland.

Individuals who value their ethnic and cultural identity tend to respond with positive affect to symbols of the nation-state, such as the flag, the national anthem, the head of state, and often certain religious symbols, insofar as they perceive the state -- and hence its symbols -- as expressions of their identity. Moreover, insofar as they see the state as an embodiment of the nation and linked to the nation via emotionally arousing symbols, they tend to treat it as a sacred object in its own right. With time, national symbols or the state apparatus may independently elicit the loyalty and obedience of citizens, even though their link with the ultimate source of legitimacy has been broken. That is, a person may learn to respond emotionally to national symbols, and thus extend his loyalty to the system that invokes them, without reference to the cultural values that these symbols originally represented. Similarly, a person may learn to regard the state apparatus as sacrosanct and to give it his unquestioning obedience, without regard to the national ethos that the state originally embodied and with only minimal emotional involvement in natinnal symbols. I assume, however, that a system can maintain its legitimacy for the long run only if there is at least a periodic renewal of the cultural values on which legitimacy ultimately rests, particularly at times when there is a need to consolidate a population that is internally divided.

Individuals who perceive the system as meeting the population's needs and interests are likely to involve themselves actively and fully in social roles mediated by the system, such as occupational and community roles, or roles in voluntary associations. Since the effective enactment of important social roles depends on the system,they have a personal stake in its integrity and are inclined to accept the legitimacy of its authority. Furthermore, insofar as the system is seen as an effective instrument in meeting the interests of the population and in providing the individual with an opportunity for participation in meaningful social roles, he is likely to develop a commitment to law and order in their own right. He accepts the legitimacy of the system because he is concerned with maintaining the orderly and predictable procedures without which the system cannot run smoothly. Loyalty to the system based on participation in subsystem roles and respect for law and order derive from the fact that the system is perceived as meeting the needs and interests of the general population. Again, though, these links may be broken and involvement in social roles or commitment to law and order may become functionally autonomous bases of legitimacy. For the long-run legitimacy of the system, however, there must at least be periodic reassessments of the adequacy of its institutions in serving the entire population, particularly at times of pronounced intrasocietal conflict.

When a population accepts the legitimacy of the political system, then it is prepared to extend its loyalty to the specific government or administration that is in charge of the system at any given time. There is one proviso, however, and that is that the government acquire and use its power by legitimate processes, by procedures that conform to the rules and requirements of the system. Legitimate authority cannot be exercised in arbitrary fashion, but must always be referred to the external legitimizing agency (such as a constitution) from which it is derived. A system cannot remain legitimate in the long run unless there is some way of defining the conditions under which authority is being used in illegitimate fashion and removing from power those who are responsible for such a misuse of their authority.

A government that is legitimate, by virtue of both the legitimacy of the political system that it operates and its own conformity to the requirements of that system, can count on the loyalty of the citizenry and their readiness to meet the expectations of the citizen role. Moreover, such a government has at its disposal various mechanisms for strengthening the loyalty of citizens and reinforcing the legitimacy of the system itself. Of special importance are its ability to appeal to national symbols and to exert influence on individuals by means of their subsystem roles. These mechanisms are also used within the limits of their ability to do so, by the governments of new nation-states, who have yet to establish a firm basis of legitimacy for the system. Such governments attempt to develop national symbols and to promote emotional commitments to them in the hope that out of these symbols a genuine sense of national identity will emerge. Similarly, they attempt to create within that small segment of the population that has meaningful roles in the incipient national society a commitment to the political system, in the hope that they will then contribute to the establishment of social institutions that are conducive to the general welfare.

National symbols and subsystem roles are also central to two more general processes whereby the modern nation-state creates, renews, and utilizes the loyalty of its citizens: (1) the process of socialization and (2) a process that might best be called "entanglement." Loyalty to the nations is instilled in the child in the course of his socialization through major primary groups, particularly the family and the church. The state draws on the importance of these institutions to an individual's personal identity, on his emotional commitment to them and on their sacredness in his eyes in order to create a sentimental attachment to the political system. Also, loyalty to the nation-state is deliberately and systematically fostered in the school. What happens, essentially, in the course of socialization -- and particularly in the schools -- is an emotional conditioning of the child to national symbols. Thus, whenever it becomes necessary to mobilize the population in periods of crisis, national symbols can be brought into play to heighten emotional arousal. In sum, the nation-state's unusual power over the loyalty of its citizens derives in part from its control over the schools and from its linkage to such primary, affect-laden socializing agencies as the family and the church.

A second process for engendering loyalty draws on the nation-state's extensive control over the economic and social institutions of the society. In the complex, bureaucratically structured, modern nation-state, citizens are highly dependent on the central authorities. The proper functioning of citizens in their various social roles, including their occupational roles and their roles in local communities, is vitally affected by agencies of the national system. Thus, they are "entangled" in the system in the sense that various important roles are thoroughly tied to it. To defend the system becomes tantamount to defending their total way of life.

## Cognitive and affective barriers to the development of a global society

The basic assumption of the ideology of the modern nation-state, as has been pointed out, is that the unit that meets the needs and interests of the population (and is entrusted with the necessary power to do so) must also be the unit that reflects the cultural identity of the population. Though an ideology joining these two elements is often highly functional, there are times when the proposition that only a system reflecting the population's ethnic character can properly look out for its needs and interests may became quite dysfunctional. Within an established nation-state, such an ideology may have dysfunctional consequences for two general reasons: (1) If there are strong ethnic and cultural divisions within a state, then this ideology may interfere with the government's ability to organize the society effectively. (2) If the state is unable to meet some of the needs and interests of its population (or of some segment of its population) adequately, then an ideology based on the correspondence of sentimental and instrumental components may interfere with the search for alternative ways of meeting these needs and interests.

The first type of dysfunction of the nationalist ideology is particularly marked in new nation-states, such as Nigeria, that have not yet developed a common national identity; but it also manifests itself in many older states characterized by major ethnic divisions, such as Canada.

The second type of dysfunction is particularly germane to our present discussion. As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, there are many functions, which by their inherent nature and by the nature of the modern world, cannot be properly met by the sovereign nation-state. The ideology of the nation-state, however, erects barriers to supranational or transnational patterns of organizing for these functions.

Supranational arrangements are particularly functional for the management of conflict between nations. Yet conflict situations tend to strengthen sentimental attachments to the nation-state and thus to make it even more difficult to turn over any part of its authority to other units. There is a strong tendency to perceive a conflict situation as one that threatens the basic identity and integrity of a people; and its management can, therefore, only be entrusted to a leadership that reflects the national identity. These tendencies are further reinforced by the extent to which the national government is able to shape public opinion -- through its access to the mass media and to opinion leaders representing the whole range of social institutions -- and thus define the conflict situation.

In short, both general societal processes (such as those of socialization and entanglement) and the processes that are brought into play in specific conflict situations bring about a structuring of people's reality world that favors the national system, particularly as far as the dimension of authority is concerned. We define the world in terms of the nation-state and our thinking and reactions are dominated by that perspective. The nation is perceived as a natural unit and its exercise of final authority is regarded as self-evidently right. It easily out-competes other entities, particularly transnational ones, in eliciting the loyalty of its citizens. To a considerable extent, it can take their loyalty for granted -- as something given in the structure of reality -- without having to create strong motivations to attain it.

The perspective of the nation-state dominates our thinking to such a degree that even professional students of international relations are generally unable to escape it. They tend to use the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis and as the primary actor in the international system. Even those whose observations are based on the behavior of decision-makers tend to assume that the nation-state is the decision-making unit and that the decision-makers speak for it. These assumptions are often justified; but if we build them into our conceptualization, we are unable to discover when they do not hold and under what conditions the global system could be organized in terms of an alternative set of assumptions. Thus, our very way of studying the international system is a major factor in determining and reinforcing its character. The organization of the world in terms of nation-states, however, has such a powerful hold on our thinking that it is almost impossible to conceive it in different terms.

These enormous cognitive barriers to the establishment of transnational institutions, even whey they would be clearly more functional than national ones, are further reinforced by affective barriers to the extension of loyalty to such transnational institutions. Even when there is no incompatibility at all , in principle, between transnational loyalty and national loyalty, many segments of a national population tend to view the two in competitive terms.

Whenever a situation is structured in terms of a competition between national and transnational loyalties, the latter almost invariably lose out. Transnational institutions typically lack legitimacy because they are not supported by important sentimental or instrumental links for most individuals.

They do not have at their disposal the kinds of mechanisms of concerted socialization that are available to the nation-state, in which major societal institutions collaborate from the very beginning in building loyalty to the system. Educational efforts geared to "world citizenship" are distinctly limited in their capacity to create sentimental attachments and cannot substitute for the emotional conditioning and the many-sided reinforcement that underlies national loyalty. Similarly, transnational institutions do not have at their disposal -- given the structure of the international system -- mechanisms for entangling individuals in social roles and for creating functional interdependencies. Thus, international authority (as epitomized, for example, by international law) turns out to be, in the eyes of most individuals, an abstract, artificial construct, in contrast to national authority, which has concrete and existential meaning.

The competitive disadvantage of transnational institutions does not merely represent a quantitative problem. It is not only that national commitments are stronger, but they are in a qualitatively different position from other kinds of commitments, both to larger and to smaller units, or to units organized on a cross-cutting principle. The development of institutions for a global society requires more than the provision of new motivations and new information. It requires the creation of a new conception of the world system in which the nation-state is not seen as the only operating unit or as the natural and self-evident basis of organizing to carry out the functions of a society.

## Overcoming the barriers to a global society

An understanding of the nature of the nation-state and of the barriers it presents to alternative ways of organizing the world system is itself a major contribution to overcoming these barriers. In addition, however, it is important to identify and analyze existing trends that favor the development of a global society and institutional arrangements that exemplify -- even if only in rudimentary fashion -- transnational means of carrying out societal functions. An awareness of concrete alternative possibilities may be the best way of breaking the hold that the nation-state has on the structure of reality.

I touched briefly on the trends favorable to the development of a global society at the beginning of this article. In the remaining paragraphs let me look at some of the major directions of change that would be most conducive to overcoming the barriers imposed by the nation-state to desirable transnational arrangements.

At the level of the nation-state itself, a potentially helpful trend -- from the point of view of developing a global society -- has been the steady shift away from a highly sentimental type of nationalism to a more instrumental type. This is particularly true in industrialized nations, since it is in keeping with their bureaucratic orientation. It is also true, however, in many emerging nation-states, whose leaders are both aware of their limitations in appealing to a barely existent sense of national identity and eager to find the most effective way of improving the conditions of life in their societies. Instrumental attachments to the nation-state are, by and large, more compatible with transnational arrangements than are sentimental attachments. Instrumental attachments permit a more pragmatic approach to the organization of societal affairs and make for a greater openness to transnational institutions and organizations, if these are seen as having functional value.

The European Economic Community is an excellent example of a transnational -- or even a supranational -- arrangement developed by pragmatic bureaucrats because they saw it as a more effective vehicle for carrying out their economic functions than the individual nation-state.

An orientation to the nation-state that is primarily instrumental in nature doe not presuppose an abandonment of sentimental attachments to the nation or the state Rather, it implies an ability to separate instrumental and sentimental attachments so that the nation-state is not perceived -- by virtue of the fact that it reflects the ethnic-cultural identity of the population -- as the only proper vehicle for meeting its needs and interests. In other words, an attitude conducive to transnational arrangements is one that recognizes that the nation-state, though it may well be the carrier of one's cultural identity and valued as such, is not therefore necessarily the best instrument for achieving *all* of the goals of a population. Such an attitude implies considerable flexibility in the citizen's image of the nation-state,which allows him to see it as an important but not as the exclusive object of his loyalty.

At the international level, the trends most favorable to a global society are found in the development of functional interdependencies cutting across national lines. Transnational institutions and mechanisms are most likely to evolve out of instrumental rather than sentimental considerations. At the sentimental level, it is much more difficult to overcome the attachment to the nation-state, which is almost by definition highly exclusive in nature; accordingly, it would be almost impossible for transnational institutions to compete effectively with the nation-state at that level.

I see little value, therefore, in efforts to develop international symbols and deliberate attempts to create a sense of international identity. Once individuals become instrumentally involved in transnational institutions, a degree of sentimental attachment will spontaneously follow in due course.

Functional interdependencies or instrumental involvements in transnational institutions arise as more and more important segments of national societies become entangled in a network of international contacts and arrangements that are relevant to some of their vital needs and interests. Prime examples of such entanglements are provided by the participation of individuals in transnational organizations that enable them both to enact their professional roles in a personally meaningful way and to work for the benefit of groups with which they are positively identified. A wide variety of organizations would be relevant here, including organizations concerned with problems of business, labor, agriculture, health, welfare, education, science, literature, the arts, and religion. They may range from intergovernmental organizations (such as those linked to the United Nations) to private organizations set up on a completely non-national basis. One extreme of the range is exemplified by organizational mechanisms that are deliberately set up to manage and resolve international conflicts. The other extreme is represented by the totally unofficial and largely unorganized world-wide youth movement that serves to express the common concerns and values of the emerging generation. What is critical in all of these organizations is that they create, for their participants, strong functional ties to a global society. They become committed, in one area of their lives, to a transnational definition of the world, because such a definition is instrumental to meeting specific needs and interests that have personal significance for them.

Instrumental attachments to a global society, and the sentimental attachments that may evolve from them, need not be viewed in terms of loyalty to a higher or wider unit that subsumes the nation-state. Such a view would tend to pose the issue as one of competition between the nation-state and larger units, and, as we have already seen, the nation-state has a decisive advantage in such a competition. Rather, we are dealing here with a different principle of organization that cuts across the division of the world into national units. It is not a matter of transferring loyalty from a smaller to a larger unit but of entertaining multiple loyalties in keeping with our multiple roles in a variety of cross-cutting functional systems. Such loyalties to functional, cross-cutting entities can more readily bypass the dominance of the national system and promote the concept of a global society by strengthening institutions organized without regard to national boundaries for the purposes of meeting universal needs and interests.

One of the priority functions of education, then, ought to be to communicate an understanding of the potential of such cross-cutting arrangements, unhampered by a fixation on the nation-state as the exclusive vehicle for carrying out societal function. Without such an understanding the new generation will be ill-equipped to deal with the realities of an increasingly interdependent world system.

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